Skills/Glama/turing_agentmemory_mcp

turing_agentmemory_mcp@0.1.0

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Enables persistent agent memory and document ingestion with hybrid vector and lexical retrieval, memory lifecycle management, graph-backed entities, preferences, facts, and cited search through ArcadeDB. It also supports provider-agnostic embeddings and reranking, durable file processing, and optional governance/redaction hooks." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher chetto983 · publishing for 0 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 1 h ago
$npx skills add turing_agentmemory_mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
AGENTMEMORY_AUTH_CLIENT_IDAGENTMEMORY_AUTH_TOKENAGENTMEMORY_UTCP_AUTH_ENVOPENAI_API_KEYPROVIDER_API_KEY_HEADERPROVIDER_API_KEY_SCHEME or --max-context-tokens / --question-api-key-envConfiguration, not credentials: AGENTMEMORY_AUDIT_JSONL, AGENTMEMORY_FILE_PIPE_CHUNK_BYTES, AGENTMEMORY_FILE_PIPE_ROOTS, AGENTMEMORY_FILE_PIPE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS, AGENTMEMORY_FUSION_WEIGHTS, AGENTMEMORY_GRAPH, AGENTMEMORY_LAB_BENCHMARK_DIR, AGENTMEMORY_OBSERVABILITY_JSONL, AGENTMEMORY_OBSERVABILITY_STDERR, AGENTMEMORY_REDACTION_ENABLED, AGENTMEMORY_REMOTE_MCP_URL, AGENTMEMORY_SPARSE_PATH, AGENTMEMORY_TENANT_REGISTRY_PATH, AGENTMEMORY_UPLOAD_CHUNK_BYTES, AGENTMEMORY_UPLOAD_MAX_FILE_BYTES, AGENTMEMORY_UPLOAD_ROOT, AGENTMEMORY_UTCP_MCP_COMMAND, AGENTMEMORY_UTCP_SERVER_NAME, ARCADEDB_COMMUNITY_INDEX, ARCADEDB_DOCUMENT_INDEX, ARCADEDB_E2E_HOME, ARCADEDB_ENTITY_INDEX, ARCADEDB_FACT_INDEX, ARCADEDB_MEMORY_INDEX, BERTONI_HOME, E2E_USE_EXTERNAL_EMBED, E2E_USE_EXTERNAL_RERANK, EMBED_BASE_URL, EMBED_DIMENSIONS, EMBED_MODEL, GLINER_BACKEND, GLINER_BASE_URL, GLINER_BATCH_SIZE, GLINER_DEVICE
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso openrouter.ai, huggingface.co — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names openrouter.ai, huggingface.co as well as its own vendor. The guard injects AGENTMEMORY_AUTH_CLIENT_ID, AGENTMEMORY_AUTH_TOKEN, AGENTMEMORY_UTCP_AUTH_ENV, OPENAI_API_KEY, PROVIDER_API_KEY_HEADER, PROVIDER_API_KEY_SCHEME only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 86/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/real_document_benchmark.py:98 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesparser.add_argument("--env-file", default=".env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/turing_agentmemory_mcp/e2e_score_stubs.py:218 · Python subprocess execution detectedstart_result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/eval_backboard_locomo_mcp_dataset.py:140 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.check_output(Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/turing_agentmemory_mcp/e2e_score_stubs.py:210 · Python subprocess execution detectedstop_result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/spike/full_agent_chat.py:46 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(["nvidia-smi"], capture_output=True, timeout=5, check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈2,775 tok
1 file · 80 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.