Skills/Glama/ttm-telegram

ttm-telegram@0.1.2

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Enables reading and searching messages from allowed Telegram groups using your own Telegram account, with tools to list permitted groups, fetch messages by date range, and search by keyword. It runs locally over stdio and only accesses groups explicitly allowed via configuration." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher toantranmei · publishing for 0 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 2 h ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso telegram.org, githubusercontent.com, example.invalid — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 74/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Pipe-to-shell pattern; Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 3 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
0.0sprocessexec /usr/bin/uname
0.0sprocessexec /usr/bin/mktemp
0.0sprocessexited 1: mktemp: failed to create directory via template '/tmp/tmp.XXXXXXXXXX': Permission denied
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/uname
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/mktemp
0.2sprocessexited 1: mktemp: failed to create directory via template '/tmp/tmp.XXXXXXXXXX': Permission denied

Static findings

CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patterninstall.sh:3 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote code# curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/toantranmei/ttm-telegram/main/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
HIGH
Direct script execution from GitHub raw URLinstall.sh:3 · Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL — unverified code source# curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/toantranmei/ttm-telegram/main/install.sh | shFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedpackaging/smoke_test.py:15 · Python subprocess execution detectedp = subprocess.Popen([binary], stdin=subprocess.PIPE, stdout=subprocess.PIPE,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagemcpb/pack.sh:17 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codenpx --yes "$CLI" pack "$dir" "$out/ttm-telegram-$name.mcpb" < /dev/nullFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandpackaging/linux-inside.sh:12 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschown -R "$HOST_UID:$HOST_GID" dist build-linuxFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellinstall.sh:3 · Remote installer piped to shell# curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/toantranmei/ttm-telegram/main/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandmcpb/pack.sh:15 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionscp "$file" "$dir/server/$bin"; chmod +x "$dir/server/$bin"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈37 tok
1 file · 19 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

6 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim toantranmei: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  4. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  5. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  6. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
Publish a new version to Glama, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim toantranmeiPropose a patch to the maintainer