ttm-jira@0.1.1
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "Enables Claude to work with a self-hosted Jira Server/Data Center instance using your own Personal Access Token over local stdio. Supports creating and updating issues, resolving custom fields by name, finding and applying workflow transitions, managing links and sprints, reading and setting Smart Checklists, and generating day/user/module reports." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
JIRA_PERSONAL_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: JIRA_DEFAULT_PROJECTS, JIRA_MODULE_RULES, JIRA_SSL_VERIFY, JIRA_TZ_OFFSET, JIRA_URL- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso githubusercontent.com, example.invalid — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names githubusercontent.com, example.invalid as well as its own vendor. The guard injects JIRA_PERSONAL_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 74/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Pipe-to-shell pattern; Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 3 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
cp "$file" "$dir/server/$bin"; chmod +x "$dir/server/$bin"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.# curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/toantranmei/ttm-jira/main/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.npx --yes "$CLI" pack "$dir" "$out/ttm-jira-$name.mcpb" < /dev/nullFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.chown -R "$HOST_UID:$HOST_GID" dist build-linuxFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.p = subprocess.Popen([binary], stdin=subprocess.PIPE, stdout=subprocess.PIPE,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/toantranmei/ttm-jira/main/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/toantranmei/ttm-jira/main/install.sh | shFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
6 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim toantranmei: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
- Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.