tplink-mcp@1.0.0
CAUTION· startup onlyPublisher claims: "Enables AI copilots and autonomous agents to inspect, diagnose, and safely manage TP-Link 4G/LTE gateways and broadband routers through typed MCP tools for status, signal, clients, Wi-Fi, DNS, SMS/USSD, and guarded mutations. It provides session leasing and confirmation safeguards to avoid locking out admins or disconnecting active sessions." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.- Tested
- server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
TPLINK_PASSWORDConfiguration, not credentials: PYTHON_BIN, PYTHONPATH, TPLINK_COOKIE, TPLINK_ENV, TPLINK_EXPECTED_SSID, TPLINK_ROUTER_IP, TPLINK_SESSION_COOKIE, TPLINK_USERNAME- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso gstatic.com, tailwindcss.com, dulith.me — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names gstatic.com, tailwindcss.com, dulith.me as well as its own vendor. The guard injects TPLINK_PASSWORD only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-12 and scored it 73/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; URL with embedded credentials; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 20 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
description: Router IP address or URL (default http://192.168.1.1)Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.out = subprocess.check_output(["ip", "route", "show", "default"], stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, timeout=2).decode()Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.env_file = Path(os.environ.get("TPLINK_ENV", ".env"))Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.out = subprocess.check_output(["iw", "dev"], stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, timeout=2).decode()Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.<link href="https://fonts.googleapis.com/css2?family=JetBrains+Mono:wght@400;500;600;700&family=Plus+Jakarta+Sans:wght@400;500;600;700;800&display=swap" rel="stylesheet">Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."""Reads simple KEY=VALUE pairs from an .env file."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.out = subprocess.check_output(["route", "-n", "get", "default"], stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, timeout=2).decode()Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.3. Local project .env or $TPLINK_ENVFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.out = subprocess.check_output(["route", "print", "0.0.0.0"], stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, timeout=2).decode()Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# 3. Project .env or custom env fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.f"3. **Enable Linux TCP BBR**: `sudo ./scripts/optimize-network.sh enable` for bufferbloat mitigation.",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.res = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout_sec)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."sudo ./scripts/optimize-network.sh enable"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.default: "http://192.168.1.1"Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.out = subprocess.check_output(["nmcli", "-t", "-f", "active,ssid", "dev", "wifi"], stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, timeout=2).decode()Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.<p class="text-xs text-zinc-500 mb-2">// Standalone zero-install container from GitHub Packages ($0 cost)</p> <pre class="text-emerald-400">docker run -i --rm -Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.client_broad = RouterClientFactory.get_client("http://192.168.0.1", "secret", force_family="broadband")Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.DEFAULT_HOST = "http://192.168.1.1"Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.is_safe, msg = NetworkGuard.check_safety("http://192.168.1.1", expected_ssid="dulith.connect")Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.host="http://192.168.1.1",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.host="http://192.168.1.1",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.is_safe, msg = NetworkGuard.check_safety("http://192.168.1.1", force=True)Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.family = RouterClientFactory.detect_model_family("http://192.168.1.1")Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.host=cfg.get("host", "http://192.168.1.1"),Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.is_safe, msg = NetworkGuard.check_safety("http://192.168.1.1")Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.host: str = "http://192.168.1.1",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.host="http://192.168.1.1",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.client_mr = RouterClientFactory.get_client("http://192.168.1.1", "secret", force_family="mr")Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.self.client = TPLinkMRClient("http://192.168.1.1", "secret")Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.is_safe, msg = NetworkGuard.check_safety("http://192.168.1.1", expected_ssid="dulith.connect")Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.family = RouterClientFactory.detect_model_family("http://192.168.0.1")Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
7 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim dulithdivisekara: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- URL with embedded credentials≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- URL to a private-network address≈ +1 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.