Skills/Glama/todo-planner-mcp

todo-planner-mcp@0.1.0

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Exposes Microsoft To Do and Microsoft Planner over the Microsoft Graph API with delegated authentication, letting an assistant read and write personal tasks, checklists, and shared team tasks—including assigning Planner tasks to other people—and also search OneNote notebooks and pages read-only." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher overcoataim · publishing for 2 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 2d ago
$npx skills add todo-planner-mcp
WatchReport an issue

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
TPM_AUTHORITYTPM_CLIENT_SECRETTPM_TOKEN_CACHEConfiguration, not credentials: OPTIN_MEMBER, OUTSIDER, TPM_CLIENT_ID, TPM_OPTIN_GROUP, TPM_REDIRECT_URI, TPM_SCOPES, TPM_TENANT_ID
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso microsoft.com, microsoftonline.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names microsoft.com, microsoftonline.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects TPM_AUTHORITY, TPM_CLIENT_SECRET, TPM_TOKEN_CACHE only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-12 and scored it 82/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Privileged sudo commandCLAUDE.md:81 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges- Bare WSL Ubuntu may lack venv/pip: `sudo apt install -y python3-venv python3-pip`.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsCLAUDE.md:69 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- `.env` keys: `TPM_CLIENT_ID`, `TPM_TENANT_ID`, `TPM_CLIENT_SECRET`, `TPM_REDIRECT_URI`,Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/todo_planner_mcp/config.py:1 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Configuration loaded from environment (.env)."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/todo_planner_mcp/config.py:37 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Minimal .env loader (no dependency); does not override real env vars."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/guard_test.py:9 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesUses TPM_OPTIN_GROUP from .env. With no group, every other person counts as not signed up.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsCLAUDE.md:85 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- `cp .env.example .env`, fill it in, then `--check` → `--login` → `scripts/smoke_live.py`.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsCLAUDE.md:48 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconfig.py # .env loader (no dep) -> Settings (client_id, authority, scopes, cache, opt-in group)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsCLAUDE.md:60 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files.env.example / .mcp.json.exampleFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/todo_planner_mcp/server.py:4 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filespython -m todo_planner_mcp.server --check # offline: validate .env and list toolsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/todo_planner_mcp/config.py:50 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Load .env from project root (two levels up from this file) if present.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsCLAUDE.md:5 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files> committed files — they live in `.env` only.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/todo_planner_mcp/config.py:57 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"TPM_CLIENT_ID is not set. Copy .env.example to .env and set your "Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/todo_planner_mcp/config.py:52 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files_load_dotenv(root / ".env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,662 tok
2 files · 23 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.