Skills/Glama/threads

threads@0.1.0

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Enables AI agents to access one social-media account for publishing, replying, reading feeds, profiles and comments, searching, and performing likes, follows, and reposts, using official APIs where available and a persistent remote browser otherwise." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher astroboyfromspace · publishing for 2 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 2d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
API_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: BROWSER_HEADED, DATA_DIR, PUBLIC_MEDIA_BASE_URL, THREADS_API_URL
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso threads.net, threads.com, cdn.test — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names threads.net, threads.com, cdn.test as well as its own vendor. The guard injects API_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-12 and scored it 73/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Privileged sudo command; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdeploy/render-nginx.sh:12 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesif [[ ! -f .env ]]; thenFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commanddeploy/render-nginx.sh:67 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesecho " sudo htpasswd -cB ${HTPASSWD} admin" >&2Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdeploy/check-ports.sh:16 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesset -a; source .env; set +aFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdeploy/render-nginx.sh:2 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Генерирует конфиг nginx из шаблона, подставляя домен и порты из .env.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdeploy/render-nginx.sh:13 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesecho "Нет файла .env — скопируй .env.example и заполни." >&2Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdeploy/check-ports.sh:10 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesif [[ ! -f .env ]]; thenFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commanddeploy/render-nginx.sh:51 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesecho "Это предпросмотр. Установить: sudo ./deploy/render-nginx.sh --install" >&2Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdeploy/check-ports.sh:2 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Проверяет, свободны ли хостовые порты из .env, до того как docker composeFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commanddeploy/render-nginx.sh:56 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesecho "Установка требует root: sudo ./deploy/render-nginx.sh --install" >&2Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdeploy/check-ports.sh:11 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesecho "Нет файла .env — скопируй .env.example и заполни." >&2Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsAGENTS.md:23 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesnpm run dev # tsx watch src/main.ts (нужен заполненный .env)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdeploy/render-nginx.sh:3 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Порт задан ровно в одном месте (.env) и потому не может разъехаться сFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsAGENTS.md:112 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files`.env`**: оттуда их берёт и `docker-compose.yml`, и `deploy/render-nginx.sh`,Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/collect-background.sh:162 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Контейнер отдаёт наружу порт из .env, а сборщик по умолчанию идёт на 8080 —Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:27 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsRUN mkdir -p /var/lib/threads-api && chown -R pwuser:pwuser /var/lib/threads-api /appFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/collect-background.sh:149 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesif [[ ! -f .env ]]; thenFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/collect-background.sh:114 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill -TERM -- "-$pid" 2>/dev/null || kill -TERM "$pid"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src/mcp/main.ts:64 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkconst server = createMcpServer(callOverHttp);Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/collect.ts:134 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconsole.error("Сервис не принял токен — проверь API_TOKEN в .env.");Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/collect-background.sh:155 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesset -a; source .env; set +aFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/collect-background.sh:150 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesecho "Нет файла .env — без него неизвестен токен сервиса." >&2Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageAGENTS.md:19 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codenpx vitest run test/oauth.test.ts # один файлFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/collect-background.sh:41 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill -0 "$pid" 2>/dev/null || return 1Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/collect-background.sh:35 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# pidfile (после kill -9 или перезагрузки) не должен выглядеть как работа.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiontest/http.test.ts:72 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesexpect(response.json()).toEqual({ ok: true, data: { id: "post-1" } });Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commanddeploy/login-session.sh:55 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschown -R pwuser:pwuser "${PROFILE_DIR}"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsdocker-compose.yml:25 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Наружу — только петлевой интерфейс хоста и порт из .env.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageAGENTS.md:20 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codenpx vitest run -t "имя теста" # один тест по названиюFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiontest/http.test.ts:85 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesexpect(response.json().error.code).toBe("INVALID_INPUT");Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/collect.ts:50 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`Выгружено ${posts.length} постов в ${args.exportTo}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/collect-background.sh:158 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesecho "В .env не задан API_TOKEN — сервис не пустит." >&2Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsdocker-compose.yml:17 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_file: .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/collect-background.sh:116 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill -0 "$pid" 2>/dev/null || breakFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,451 tok
2 files · 64 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

7 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim astroboyfromspace: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  5. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  6. MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)≈ +2 on the totalNamespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
Publish a new version to Glama, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim astroboyfromspacePropose a patch to the maintainer