Skills/Glama/thinkerwave

thinkerwave@r1

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Autonomous Agents they research, they verify and correct themself to find solution ." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher thinkerwave-ai · publishing for 31 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 33 h ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
6 of 6 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
THINKERWAVE_API_KEY
Where it talks to
thinkerwave.ai (its own)
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for THINKERWAVE_API_KEY and talks to thinkerwave.ai. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --secrets THINKERWAVE_API_KEY=thinkerwave.ai -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is thinkerwave@r1 safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 77/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Credential pass-through configuration; Image alt text carrying instructions. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.1sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'httpx'
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.1sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'httpx'
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.3sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'httpx'
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.3sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'pydantic'
0.3sprocess6 of 6 bundled scripts run with no arguments
0.3sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.3sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.3sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathspython/tests/test_client.py:88 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filestw.runs.download(rid, "../../etc/passwd", to=tmp_path)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationpython/src/thinkerwave/client.py:57 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentialsraise InvalidKeyError("invalid_key", "No API key. Set THINKERWAVE_API_KEY or pass api_key=… "Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
MEDIUM
Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/bug.md:17 · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — social engineeringDo not paste your API key.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
MEDIUM
Privileged sudo command.github/workflows/ci.yml:46 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo install gitleaks /usr/local/bin/gitleaksFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathspython/tests/test_client.py:94 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filestw.runs.download(rid, "/etc/passwd", to=tmp_path)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/wrong_answer.md:15 · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — social engineeringDo not paste your API key. Don't paste confidential details from your problem — the run id is enough for us to look it up.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
Image alt text carrying instructionsREADME.md:13 · Image alt text carrying instructionsA real two-round ThinkerWave run in the terminalFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈38 tok
1 file · 50 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

3 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim thinkerwave-ai: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
  3. Credential pass-through configuration≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  6. Privileged sudo command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
Publish a new version to Glama, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim thinkerwave-aiPropose a patch to the maintainer