tg2codexmcp@0.2.0
CAUTION· install onlyPublisher claims: "Enables MCP clients to retrieve, search, and inspect Telegram bot messages from a bounded local store, with optional explicitly enabled allowlisted sends." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
INGRESS_SECRETMCP_SEND_TOKENMCP_TOKENTELEGRAM_BOT_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: ALLOWED_CHAT_IDS, CALLBACK_HOSTS, DB_PATH, ENABLE_EVENTS, ENABLE_SEND, INGESTION_MODE, MCP_TRANSPORT, RETENTION_DAYS, SEND_CHAT_IDS- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso telegram.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names telegram.org as well as its own vendor. The guard injects INGRESS_SECRET, MCP_SEND_TOKEN, MCP_TOKEN, TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-12 and scored it 78/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Telegram Bot API URL; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
const prior = this.store.db.prepare('SELECT * FROM sends WHERE id=?').get(p.idempotency_key);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.8. Preserve LICENSE and notices. Never commit .env, credentials, chat contents, logs, SQLite files, lock files or personal configurations.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.const response = await post(`https://api.telegram.org/bot${token}/${method}`, JSON.stringify(params), {}, signal);Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.for (const file of ['.env.example', 'examples/http.env.example', 'examples/offline.env.example']) {Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."start": "node --env-file=.env dist/src/main.js",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.const res = await this.post(`https://api.telegram.org/bot${c.botToken}/sendMessage`, JSON.stringify({ chat_id: p.chat_id, text: p.text, link_preview_options: { is_disabled: true } }), {});Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.<summary>Running several clients at once?</summary><p>Use one shared HTTP process for the bot and database. Configure your private <code>.env</code> from the <aFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.this.store.db.prepare('INSERT INTO sends VALUES(?,?,?,?,?)').run(p.idempotency_key, hash, 'unknown', null, Date.now());Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.this.store.db.prepare("UPDATE sends SET state='sent',result=? WHERE id=?").run(JSON.stringify(result), p.idempotency_key);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.if (Number(this.store.db.prepare('SELECT count(*) AS n FROM sends').get()!.n) >= 100000) throw new AppError('send_ledger_full', 503);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.…Address('8.8.8.8'), true); for (const url of ['http://receiver.example.com', 'https://user:[email protected]', 'https://receiver.example.com:444/', 'https://evil.exampl…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
2 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim vladimirperepelytsia: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Telegram Bot API URL≈ +4 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
- File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
- URL with embedded credentials≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.