Skills/Glama/terrace

terrace@0.2.0

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Turns a football take into a 1v1 challenge bet, previews the rule it settles by, shares a link the other side can accept, and pays out winnings once official match data or an AI judge resolves it. Runs against live escrow contracts on Monad testnet with free test dollars, so no one holds the stakes." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher lopeselio · publishing for 0 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 1 h ago
$npx skills add terrace
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Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
TERRACE_PRIVATE_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: MONAD_RPC_URL, TERRACE_AGENT_NAME, TERRACE_HOME, TERRACE_MAX_STAKE, TERRACE_URL
Where it talks to
terrace.social (its own)Also monad.xyz, monadexplorer.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names monad.xyz, monadexplorer.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects TERRACE_PRIVATE_KEY only into requests to terrace.social (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --secrets TERRACE_PRIVATE_KEY=terrace.social -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 87/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:160 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary><b>From source</b></summary> ```bash git clone https://github.com/lopeselio/terrace-mcp && cd terrace-mcp npm install && npm run build ``` Then point yFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01

No other findings across 3,348 lines in 12 files.

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈34 tok
1 file · 12 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.