terminal-mcp@1.0.0
BLOCKED· install onlyPublisher claims: "Enables executing shell commands and rendering their ANSI-colored output as styled PNG terminal screenshots with selectable themes, window chrome, watermarks, and timestamps. Useful for pentest reports, documentation, and professional terminal captures." Observed in sandbox: reads credential files, sends data to storage.googleapis.com.
Coverage
Install scripts ran; no agent task scenario for this bundle.- Tested
- install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Blocked here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Revoked: guards refuse to launch this version
confirmed incident: read ~/.npmrc; contacted storage.googleapis.com (undeclared) Every machine running vet-skills guard stops starting it at the next launch; the state clears when the honeypot re-run or a reviewer clears it.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso nodesource.com, nodejs.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What we saw when it ran
- read ~/.npmrc · contacted storage.googleapis.com (undeclared)
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Do not connect it. The honeypot or a critical finding blocked this version; the evidence is below.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; install scripts ran; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-09 and scored it 30/100 (Blocked). Do not install it: the sandbox observed behaviour consistent with credential theft, exfiltration or persistence. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command. Summary: reads credential files, sends data to storage.googleapis.com.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 29 s · 2 scenariosStatic findings
sudo pacman -S --noconfirm nss atk at-spi2-atk cups libdrm libxkbcommon \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.echo " curl -fsSL https://deb.nodesource.com/setup_22.x | sudo -E bash -"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.echo " sudo apt-get install -y nodejs"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.sudo dnf install -y \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.sudo apt-get install -y \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.npx tscFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time....env,Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
50 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%An override rule (credential_read_plus_egress) caps this verdict regardless of the score. The first item below has to go before anything else counts.
- Reads credential files≈ +27 on the totalThe sandbox saw reads under ~/.ssh, ~/.aws, ~/.npmrc, ~/.config or similar. Read only files inside the project, and only the ones the task needs.
- Contacts a host you did not declare≈ +23 on the totalList every host you talk to in SKILL.md frontmatter (`network: [api.example.com]`), or stop contacting the ones you cannot justify.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim joasasantos: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Touches files outside the project≈ +7 on the totalKeep reads and writes inside the working directory, or declare the exact paths in `filesystem:` and explain why in the README.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.