teamvault@0.3.0
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "Connects any number of AI agents — Claude Code, Codex, or any MCP client — to one git-backed Markdown vault of shared team memory, exposing tools for briefings, search, reading, recent changes, sharing facts, transcripts, and urgent-item acknowledgments. Agent writes are queued and reviewed by a librarian model, then privacy-checked, linted, and committed as attributed git changes, so every agent reads the same current truth." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
TEAMVAULT_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: CODEX_HOME, TEAMVAULT_CONFIG, TEAMVAULT_NO_CLAUDE_MD, VAULT_DIR- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso apple.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names apple.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects TEAMVAULT_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-12 and scored it 72/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Hidden zero-width characters detected; Bidirectional text override characters detected. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
chmod +x "$CODEX/teamvault/refresh.sh" "$CODEX/teamvault/refresh.py"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.return subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(VAULT), *args], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=10).stdoutFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.r = subprocess.run(args, cwd=config.VAULT, env=_child_env(), capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=600,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.variables win over the file. See `.env.example` for the full list.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose._INVISIBLE = re.compile(r"[\U000E0000-\U000E007F---]")Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.git("add", "CLAUDE.md"); git("commit", "-q", "-m", "update librarian rules", author="server")Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.head = subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(VAULT), "show", f"HEAD:{rel}"], capture_output=True, text=True).stdoutFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return subprocess.run(config.BUSY_CMD, shell=True).returncode == 0Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.Popen([sys.executable, "-c", "import teamvault; teamvault.main()", "demo", str(root)],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.r = subprocess.run([RG, "-l", "-i", "-w", "--no-config", "--no-ignore", pat, *targets],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.r = subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(VAULT), *args], capture_output=True, text=True, env=env, timeout=30,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.diff = subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(VAULT), "diff", "-U0", "--", rel], capture_output=True, text=True).stdoutFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.mkdir -p "$CODEX/teamvault"; printf '%s' "$TOKEN" > "$CODEX/teamvault/token"; chmod 600 "$CODEX/teamvault/token"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts._INVISIBLE = re.compile(r"[\U000E0000-\U000E007F---]")Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.chmod +x "$D/team-briefing.sh" "$D/team-urgent.sh"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.D="$HOME/.config/teamvault"; mkdir -p "$D"; chmod 700 "$D"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.CFG="$CODEX/config.toml"; touch "$CFG"; chmod 600 "$CFG"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.assert privacy.clean("hello\U000E0041") == "hello"Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.r = subprocess.run([RG, "-i", "-n", "-F", "--no-config", "-g", "*.md", "-g", "!CONTEXT.md", "-g", "!INDEX.md",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
8 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim isaacbitran: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Hidden zero-width characters detected≈ +4 on the totalKeep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
- Bidirectional text override characters detected≈ +4 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
- New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.