Skills/Glama/synthex-mcp-server

synthex-mcp-server@1.0.0

VERIFIED· startup only

Publisher claims: "Exposes a remote catalogue of paid x402 routes as MCP tools, proxying calls and paying USDC on Base with the x402 protocol. Returns results alongside the on-chain settlement transaction hash, with a free catalogue tool for inspection." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher hermeschoosenone-debug · publishing for 3 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 3d ago
$npx skills add synthex-mcp-server
WatchReport an issue

Coverage

Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.
Tested
server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
synthexforge.com (its own)Also base.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it under the guard. Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested. The code names no credential variable and talks to synthexforge.com, its own; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-12 and scored it 85/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 37 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
17sprocessdependency install exit 0
37sclaimedstartup only: exited (0) before answering · code: 'ERR_MODULE_NOT_FOUND', url: 'file:///tmp/ks-detonate-hzxUFy/task/home/work/acme-api/.claude/skills/synthex-mcp-server/dist/generated/tools.manifest.json' } Node.js v22.23.4
37sprocessscript backend runs setup only
37sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)glama.json:47 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over network"args": ["-y", "synthex-mcp-server", "--http", "--port", "8080"],Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src/cli.ts:116 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networksynthex-mcp-server --http --port 8080 streamable HTTP transportFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/postbuild.mjs:20 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsconsole.log(`postbuild: chmod 755 ${target}`);Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)dist/cli.js:100 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networksynthex-mcp-server --http --port 8080 streamable HTTP transportFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)SKILL.md:5 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkMCP server hermeschoosenone-debug/synthex-mcp-server on Glama, built from https://github.com/hermeschoosenone-debug/synthex-mcp-server.Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionpackage.json:49 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files"build": "tsc -p tsconfig.build.json && node scripts/postbuild.mjs",Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/postbuild.mjs:20 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`postbuild: chmod 755 ${target}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstest/no-secret-leak.test.ts:42 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files'.env',Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src/cli.ts:238 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over network`synthex-mcp-server listening on http://${options.host}:${options.port}/mcp ` +Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)dist/cli.js:202 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkprocess.stderr.write(`synthex-mcp-server listening on http://${options.host}:${options.port}/mcp ` +Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstest/no-secret-leak.test.ts:146 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesit('ignores .env files', () => {Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstest/no-secret-leak.test.ts:148 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesexpect(gitignore).toMatch(/\.env/);Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈47 tok
1 file · 42 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.