supermap-gis-bridge@r1
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "Glama Dockerfile for YUYU20061107/supermap-gis-bridge 使用方式:在 Glama 该 listing 的 Admin -> Dockerfile 页面直接粘贴本文件内容 (awesome-mcp-servers 机器人要求 "add Dockerfile directly to Glama")。 构建上下文为仓库根目录。 为什么这么小就够:live/mcp_server.py 是纯 Python 标准库手写 stdio MCP 服务端(仅 import io/json/os/socket/subprocess/sys/time),无任何第三方 依赖、无 requirements.txt。initialize / tools/list / ping 全部由静态 TOOL_DEFS 在本地应答,不需要 Su" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
SM_BRIDGE_TOKENSM_BRIDGE_TOKEN_FILEConfiguration, not credentials: SM_BRIDGE_AUTOSTART, SM_BRIDGE_AUTOSTART_PYTHON, SM_BRIDGE_AUTOSTART_WORKSPACE, SM_BRIDGE_HOST, SM_BRIDGE_LOG_FILE, SM_BRIDGE_PORT, SM_LIVE_WORKSPACE_PATH- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for SM_BRIDGE_TOKEN, SM_BRIDGE_TOKEN_FILE and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is supermap-gis-bridge@r1 safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 90/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
bridge = subprocess.Popen([sys.executable, BRIDGE_PY],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.mcp = subprocess.Popen([sys.executable, MCP_PY],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.child = subprocess.Popen([AUTOSTART_PYTHON, BRIDGE_SCRIPT, AUTOSTART_WORKSPACE],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.