Skills/Glama/splitwise-mcp

splitwise-mcp@0.1.0

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Enables MCP clients such as Claude and Cursor to read balances, log expenses, split bills exactly, and record settle-ups from plain-language requests. Supports name-based lookups, guarded writes, and read-only operation." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher prakhar083 · publishing for 1 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 20 h ago
$npx skills add splitwise-mcp
WatchReport an issue

Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
SPLITWISE_API_KEYSPLITWISE_MCP_HTTP_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: SPLITWISE_BASE_URL, SPLITWISE_READ_ONLY
Where it talks to
splitwise.com (its own)
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for SPLITWISE_API_KEY, SPLITWISE_MCP_HTTP_TOKEN and talks to splitwise.com. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --secrets SPLITWISE_API_KEY=splitwise.com,SPLITWISE_MCP_HTTP_TOKEN=splitwise.com -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 93/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Latin word with Cyrillic or Greek look-alike letters (homoglyph)README.md:157 · Latin word with Cyrillic or Greek look-alike letters (homoglyph)ΣweightsFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01

No other findings across 6,103 lines in 32 files.

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈37 tok
1 file · 32 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.