Skills/Glama/solidtime-mcp

solidtime-mcp@0.1.0

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Enables MCP clients to manage time entries, projects, tasks, clients, tags, reports, invoices, and related resources through a Solidtime instance's public REST API. Supports stdio and localhost Streamable HTTP with a bring-your-own API token and optional write gating." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher si-essence · publishing for 8 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 46 h ago
$npx skills add solidtime-mcp
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Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
SOLIDTIME_API_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: SOLIDTIME_ORGANIZATION_ID, SOLIDTIME_URL
Where it talks to
solidtime.io (its own)
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for SOLIDTIME_API_TOKEN and talks to solidtime.io. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --secrets SOLIDTIME_API_TOKEN=solidtime.io -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-12 and scored it 87/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstest/config.test.ts:96 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leakingcatchError(() => loadConfig({ SOLIDTIME_URL: "https://user:[email protected]" }, [])),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandpackage.json:12 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions"build": "tsc -p tsconfig.build.json && chmod +x dist/index.js",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈37 tok
1 file · 58 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.