shorts-studio@r2
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "Exposes one tool per pipeline command so an AI agent can drive the work of turning audio into a reviewable vertical video draft: importing sources, transcribing with word timings, planning beats, generating one AI image per beat, and rendering a 1080×1920 MP4 with word-synced captions. Paid steps stay gated behind script approval given from the CLI, so agents can run the loop for Reels, TikTok and YouTube Shorts without overspending." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Connect it under the guard. Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is shorts-studio@r2 safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-10 and scored it 87/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
2. Give every beat a **moment** (below), in a `moments.json`: `[{"beat": 0, "moment": "hook"}, …]`, then `beat set --post <slug> --from moments.json`.Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.- Do NOT copy `<context>`, `<rules>`, `<project_context>` blocks into the artifactFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.…ort --post <slug>`; the user polishes in CapCut desktop (steps in `capcut/README.txt`). Then `post finalize --post <slug> --file <final.mp4>`, `post publish` once per platform, and `post archive` when it's done. ## Flow B: AI voice from a …Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.2. Give every beat a **moment** (below), in a `moments.json`: `[{"beat": 0, "moment": "hook"}, …]`, then `beat set --post <slug> --from moments.json`.Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.…ort --post <slug>`; the user polishes in CapCut desktop (steps in `capcut/README.txt`). Then `post finalize --post <slug> --file <final.mp4>`, `post publish` once per platform, and `post archive` when it's done. ## Flow B: AI voice from a …Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.- Do NOT copy `<context>`, `<rules>`, `<project_context>` blocks into the artifactFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.