Skills/Glama/sheet-mcp

sheet-mcp@r1

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Enables AI agents to inspect and safely edit .xlsx workbooks — reading ranges, searching cells, checking formulas, writing values or formulas, appending rows, and converting CSV — while preserving formulas and styles, dry-running edits by default, and refusing any save that would destroy charts, pivots, macros, or other features." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher 0xmortuex · publishing for 42 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 14d ago
$npx skills add sheet-mcp
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Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso openxmlformats.org, microsoft.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it under the guard. Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is sheet-mcp@r1 safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-09 and scored it 87/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

LOW
Prompt injection07-mcp-wrapper-and-testing/break-it.md:21 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file · informational: not an instruction file(on Windows this needs developer mode or an elevated shell).Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
Excessive HTML entities detected04-what-a-save-loses/main.py:158 · Excessive HTML entities detected — may be obfuscating contentb'<?xml version="1.0"?><!DOCTYPE l [<!ENTITY a "aaaaaaaaaa"><!ENTITY b "&a;&a;&a;&a;&a;&a;&a;&a;">]>'Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file paths07-mcp-wrapper-and-testing/main.py:197 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system fileserr, text = await call("read_range", {"path": "../etc/passwd", "sheet": "S", "range": "A1"})Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
Authorization escalation language07-mcp-wrapper-and-testing/break-it.md:21 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file · informational: not an instruction file(on Windows this needs developer mode or an elevated shell).Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedverify.py:26 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈40 tok
1 file · 27 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.