search-journal@r1
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "Enables semantic search over personal Markdown journal entries by indexing them with Ollama embeddings into a SQLite vector store and exposing retrieval through a Streamable HTTP MCP endpoint at /mcp." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso untrusted.example — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Connect it under the guard. Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is search-journal@r1 safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 83/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
- Bun automatically loads .env, so don't use dotenv.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.return Response.json({ embeddings: [await embed(body.input)] });Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.const body = await request.json() as { input: string[] };Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.RUN mkdir /data && chown bun:bun /dataFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.- `Bun.sql` for Postgres. Don't use `pg` or `postgres.js`.Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.const body = await request.json() as { input: string; model: string };Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.return Response.json({ embeddings: body.input.map(() => [1, 0, 0]) });Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.- Use `bunx <package> <command>` instead of `npx <package> <command>`Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.