Skills/Glama/sea-lite

sea-lite@0.7.1

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Enables parallel coding agents to coordinate through a fenced ticket queue with atomic claim-and-dispatch, lease-based locks, dependency-aware scheduling, typed links, batch ticket creation, and hash-chained history over a shared SQLite file." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher isokron-ai · publishing for 3 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 3d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
MIN_TOKEN_CHARS or --allow-insecure-token-fileConfiguration, not credentials: CLAUDE_CODE_SESSION_ID, CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR, MAX_SCOPE_PATH_CHARS, MAX_SCOPE_PATHS, SEA_LITE_ACTOR, SEA_LITE_HOOK_FAIL_OPEN, SEA_LITE_MAX_CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS, SEA_LITE_MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES, SEA_LITE_PROFILE, SEA_LITE_PROJECT, SEA_LITE_ROLE, SEA_LITE_TRACKS
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso openxmlformats.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names openxmlformats.org as well as its own vendor. The guard injects MIN_TOKEN_CHARS only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 78/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: URL with embedded credentials; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
URL with embedded credentialssrc/core/project.ts:117 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking* `[email protected]:o/r.git`, `ssh://[email protected]/o/r`, `https://u:[email protected]/o/r/` → `github.com/o/r`.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/core/scope.ts:271 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files* A prefix whose last segment carries an extension (`claims.ts`, `.env.local`,Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagehooks/scope-check.sh:18 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code# npx -y [email protected] — pin what you install)Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagehooks/scope-check.sh:29 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeexec npx -y [email protected] scope-check --hookFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/handlers/tickets.ts:823 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesduplicate_of = resolveId(ctx.db, input.duplicate_of);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstest/helpers.ts:54 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesreturn { ...env, ...extra };Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/handlers/links.ts:97 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconst to_id = resolveId(ctx.db, input.to_id);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/doctor.ts:310 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions`Recover: restore write permission (\`chmod u+w ${dataDir} ${join(dataDir, PROBE_FILE)}\`, or remove the probe), ` +Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/audit/lease.ts:172 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconst open = row ? unresolved(ctx.db, input.name, ['open']).map((u) => u.intent_id) : [];Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/http.ts:63 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsconst text = `${file} is readable by group or others (mode 0${mode.toString(8)}); run chmod 600 on it`;Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/audit/lease.ts:187 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconst u = unresolved(ctx.db, input.name);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/handlers/links.ts:113 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconst finding = detectCycle(dagEdges(ctx.db), [{ from: from_id, to: to_id, linkType: input.link_type }]);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/doctor.ts:100 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsproblems.push(`data dir is ${octal(dm)} (expected 0700: chmod 700 ${dataDir})`);Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/doctor.ts:131 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsif ((m & 0o077) !== 0) problems.push(`${f} is ${octal(m)}, readable by others (expected 0600: chmod 600 ${f})`);Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/handlers/links.ts:96 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconst from_id = resolveId(ctx.db, input.from_id);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/handlers/tickets.ts:918 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconst id = resolveId(ctx.db, input.id);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/audit/lease.ts:214 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconst r = getLease(ctx.db, input.name);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/handlers/tickets.ts:803 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconst id = resolveId(ctx.db, input.ticket_id);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstest/scope.test.ts:50 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesexpect(codeOf(() => normalizeScopePath('/etc/passwd'))).toBe('invalid_input');Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagesrc/cli.ts:957 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code`exec npx -y sea-lite@${VERSION} precommit\n`,Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstest/scope.test.ts:42 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesexpect(looksLikeFile('.env.local')).toBe(true);Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/handlers/tickets.ts:663 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconst id = resolveId(ctx.db, input.ticket_id);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/handlers/claims.ts:218 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconst id = resolveId(ctx.db, input.ticket_id);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/handlers/tickets.ts:237 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconst possible_duplicates = findPossibleDuplicates(ctx.db, input.title);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/core/clock.ts:248 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions// #8 review: a probe made read-only (chmod 0444, same uid) is a plant too: replace it.Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/handlers/claims.ts:195 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconst id = resolveId(ctx.db, input.ticket_id);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/audit/lease.ts:199 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesctx.db.prepare(`UPDATE sea_leases SET expires_at = ? WHERE name = ?`).run(proposed, input.name);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstest/scope.test.ts:122 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files['src/.env', 'src/*', true, 'dotfiles are covered (dot: true)'],Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/core/clock.ts:165 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions* (#8 review: it used to trust this process's clock, so `chmod 0444` on theFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/audit/lease.ts:159 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconst row = getLease(ctx.db, input.name);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈2,123 tok
1 file · 80 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

2 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim isokron-ai: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. URL with embedded credentials≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  5. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  6. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
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