Skills/Glama/screenshotapi-mcp

screenshotapi-mcp@1.0.2

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Official MCP server for ScreenshotAPI: capture website screenshots, convert URLs and HTML to PDF, record scrolling videos, scrape JavaScript-rendered pages as Markdown, text, or HTML, and run bulk captures." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher screenshot-api · publishing for 1 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 20 h ago
$npx skills add screenshotapi-mcp
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Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
SCREENSHOTAPI_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: SCREENSHOTAPI_MAX_INLINE_IMAGE_BYTES, SCREENSHOTAPI_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS
Where it talks to
screenshotapi.net (its own)Also ads-domain.com, a.com, b.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names ads-domain.com, a.com, b.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects SCREENSHOTAPI_TOKEN only into requests to screenshotapi.net (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --secrets SCREENSHOTAPI_TOKEN=screenshotapi.net -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 91/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File permission modification commandCLAUDE.md:12 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsnpm run build # tsc → dist/, then chmod +x dist/cli.jsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandpackage.json:40 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions"build": "tsc -p tsconfig.json && chmod +x dist/cli.js",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,293 tok
2 files · 13 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.