Skills/Glama/scholar-mcp

scholar-mcp@0.1.0

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Enables LLM agents to search academic literature, explore citation graphs, discover related papers, and export BibTeX using arXiv and Semantic Scholar, with prompts for evidence-grounded related-work summaries." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher raovivek02 · publishing for 5 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 5d ago
$npx skills add scholar-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
LLM_API_KEYSEMANTIC_SCHOLAR_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: ANTHROPIC_MODEL, LLM_BASE_URL, LLM_MODEL, SCHOLAR_MCP_CACHE
Where it talks to
semanticscholar.org (its own)Also arxiv.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names arxiv.org as well as its own vendor. The guard injects LLM_API_KEY, SEMANTIC_SCHOLAR_API_KEY only into requests to semanticscholar.org (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --secrets LLM_API_KEY=semanticscholar.org,SEMANTIC_SCHOLAR_API_KEY=semanticscholar.org -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-09 and scored it 93/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

No findings across 2,562 lines in 36 files.

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈36 tok
1 file · 36 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.