Skills/Glama/rugshield-402

rugshield-402@1.0.0

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Institutional pre-trade honeypot simulation, buy/sell tax verifier, and liquidity lock proofs on Base and Solana." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher ak10082247-max · publishing for 1 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 20 h ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
3 of 3 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
BUYER_PRIVATE_KEYEVM_PRIVATE_KEYKUROX_SIGNING_SECRETPRIVATE_KEYRAPIDAPI_PROXY_SECRETRUGSHIELD_PRIVATE_KEYRUGSHIELD_SERVICE_API_KEYSERVICE_API_KEYTELEGRAM_BOT_TOKENWALLET_B_PRIVATE_KEYX402_PRIVATE_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: APIFY_ACT_ID, APIFY_ACTOR_RUN_ID, APIFY_IS_AT_HOME, BASE_RPC_URL, GIT_COMMIT, MERCHANT_ADDRESS, RENDER_EXTERNAL_URL, RENDER_GIT_COMMIT, RUGSHIELD_DELIVERY_LOG, RUGSHIELD_DISABLE_DELIVERY_LOGGING, RUGSHIELD_NO_LISTEN, RUGSHIELD_PAYMENT_HEADER, RUGSHIELD_URL, SOLANA_MERCHANT_ADDRESS, SOLANA_RPC_URLS, TARGET_URL, X402_FREE_TRIAL_ENABLED, X402_FULFILLMENT_DIR
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso onrender.com, dexscreener.com, basescan.org, payai.network, solana.com, publicnode.com, workers.dev, base.org, solscan.io, telegram.org, coinbase.com, 1rpc.io, llamarpc.com, drpc.org, ethereum.org, glama.ai, sitemaps.org, gopluslabs.io, jup.ag, raydium.io, uniswap.org, geckoterminal.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names onrender.com, dexscreener.com, basescan.org, payai.network, solana.com, publicnode.com, workers.dev, base.org, solscan.io, telegram.org, coinbase.com, 1rpc.io, llamarpc.com, drpc.org, ethereum.org, glama.ai, sitemaps.org, gopluslabs.io, jup.ag, raydium.io, uniswap.org, geckoterminal.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects BUYER_PRIVATE_KEY, EVM_PRIVATE_KEY, KUROX_SIGNING_SECRET, PRIVATE_KEY, RAPIDAPI_PROXY_SECRET, RUGSHIELD_PRIVATE_KEY, RUGSHIELD_SERVICE_API_KEY, SERVICE_API_KEY, TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN, WALLET_B_PRIVATE_KEY, X402_PRIVATE_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 71/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.1sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'httpx'
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.2sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'requests'
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.3sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
0.3sprocess3 of 3 bundled scripts run with no arguments
0.3sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.3sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.3sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/start_telegram_bot.ts:12 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconsole.log("To activate the live Telegram bot, add to .env.local:");Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:26 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsRUN mkdir -p /app/data/x402 && chown -R node:node /app/dataFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/seed_solana_bazaar.ts:18 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// Load both workspace .env (Solana keypair) and canaryguard-402/.env.local (Base keypair)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/seed_solana_bazaar.ts:83 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesif (!raw) throw new Error("Missing PRIVATE_KEY in .env");Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Telegram Bot API URLsrc/bot/telegram.ts:25 · Telegram Bot API URL — data will be sent to Telegramreturn `https://api.telegram.org/bot${this.botToken}`;Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/seed_solana_bazaar.ts:19 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesfor (const rel of [".env", "canaryguard-402/.env.local"]) {Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/workers/autonomous_scanner.ts:3 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconfig({ path: ".env.local" });Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/seed_payment.ts:3 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconfig({ path: ".env" });Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Host or code assembled from base64 fragmentstest/simulator.test.ts:253 · Host or code assembled from base64 fragments…}},atob:(x:string)=>Buffer.from(x,"base64").toString("binary"),btoa:(x:string)=>Buffer.from(x,"binary").toString("base64"),fetch:async(url:string,init:any)=>{requests.push({url,init});if(!init)return new Resp…Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagesrc/bin/cli.ts:12 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codenpx rugshield <token_address> [options]Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/seed_payment.ts:2 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconfig({ path: ".env.local" });Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/seed_payment.ts:38 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"Missing Wallet B private key in .env.local (WALLET_B_PRIVATE_KEY)"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/apify_entry.ts:43 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log('[rugshield-apify] Scan output successfully pushed to dataset');Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/start_telegram_bot.ts:3 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconfig({ path: ".env.local" });Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
HTML that renders invisible but is read by the agentdocs/index.html:598 · HTML that renders invisible but is read by the agent · informational: not an instruction file# Direct x402 Paid Query ($0.010 USDC to 0x80E0Ae84679b7f11bE171DaADd492FBECf628cd6) curl -X POST https://rugshield-402.onrender.com/v1/scan \ -H "Content-Type:Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈39 tok
1 file · 75 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

9 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim ak10082247-max: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Obfuscated code≈ +5 on the totalRemove base64-assembled strings, eval of decoded text and minified blobs. Reviewers and scanners both treat unreadable code as hostile.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Telegram Bot API URL≈ +4 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
  5. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  6. Host or code assembled from base64 fragments≈ +2 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
Publish a new version to Glama, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim ak10082247-maxPropose a patch to the maintainer