Skills/Glama/rolemem

rolemem@0.3.0

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Enables AI clients to read and write a single self-hosted memory store over MCP, so memories persist across models and sessions, with JSON import/export for portability." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher kzhangmyang-cmyk · publishing for 1 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 12 h ago
$npx skills add rolemem
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Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
LLM_API_KEYROLEMEM_ADMIN_TOKENROLEMEM_AUTH_FAILSConfiguration, not credentials: LLM_BASE_URL, LLM_MODEL, ROLEMEM_DB, ROLEMEM_DIGEST_CHAR_CAP, ROLEMEM_DIGEST_MAX, ROLEMEM_PUBLIC_URL, ROLEMEM_RATE_PER_MIN, ROLEMEM_TRUST_PROXY
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso apple.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names apple.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects LLM_API_KEY, ROLEMEM_ADMIN_TOKEN, ROLEMEM_AUTH_FAILS only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 81/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)test/cli.test.ts:6 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkconst original = 'model = "gpt-5"\n\n[mcp_servers.other]\nurl = "http://x"\n\n[mcp_servers.rolemem]\nurl = "http://old"\n\n[profiles.fast]\nmodel = "mini"\n';Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/connect.ts:76 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log("For a client that cannot send headers, the key is in the URL. Treat the URL as a password. It may show up in proxy logs.\n" + `${url}/${key}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathspackage.json:16 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"demo": "node --no-warnings --env-file-if-exists=.env scripts/demo.ts",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)test/cli.test.ts:13 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkassert.ok(out.endsWith('[mcp_servers.rolemem]\nurl = "http://127.0.0.1:8787/mcp/rmk_new"\n'));Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathspackage.json:14 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"service": "node --no-warnings --env-file-if-exists=.env scripts/service.ts",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)test/cli.test.ts:18 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkassert.match(headed, /\[mcp_servers\.rolemem\.http_headers\]\nAuthorization = "Bearer rmk_new"/);Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/connect.ts:78 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesif (/127\.0\.0\.1|localhost/.test(base)) console.log("This is a local address. Cloud clients cannot reach it until you put HTTPS in front (see the README).");Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathspackage.json:15 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"connect": "node --no-warnings --env-file-if-exists=.env scripts/connect.ts",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathspackage.json:12 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"dev": "node --no-warnings --env-file-if-exists=.env --watch src/server.ts",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathspackage.json:13 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"start": "node --no-warnings --env-file-if-exists=.env src/server.ts",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/cli/clients.ts:50 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst args = [opts.node, "--no-warnings", "--env-file-if-exists=.env", "src/server.ts"];Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)test/cli.test.ts:24 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkconst out = JSON.parse(upsertCursorJson('{"mcpServers":{"gh":{"command":"gh"}},"x":1}', "rolemem", "http://h/mcp", "rmk_k"));Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)test/cli.test.ts:9 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkassert.ok(out.includes('[mcp_servers.other]\nurl = "http://x"'));Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src/cli/clients.ts:22 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over network? `${header}\nurl = ${JSON.stringify(url)}\n\n[mcp_servers.${name}.http_headers]\n${headerLines.join("\n")}\n`Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈457 tok
3 files · 47 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.