Skills/Glama/rolecard-mcp

rolecard-mcp@0.1.0

VERIFIED

Publisher claims: "Enables managing character/persona cards stored as plain-text Markdown files: listing, reading and writing cards, switching or clearing the current role, and splitting sections by 〔一代〕/〔二代〕 markers. It also renders a ready-to-inject 【人格】 block within a character limit, and is exposed both over stdio MCP and a localhost-only HTTP API with token auth." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher hellocaijiaqi · publishing for 4 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 4d ago
$npx skills add rolecard-mcp
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Coverage

Server started and answered tools/list.
Tested
MCP initialize and tools/list · every tool description, for hidden instructions · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
what the tools do when called with real credentials

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
ROLECARD_MCP_GATEWAY_SECRETROLECARD_MCP_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: DSH_HOME, DSH_PROFILE, QQ_BRIDGE_DIR, ROLECARD_MCP_GATEWAY_ID, ROLECARD_MCP_GATEWAY_TRANSPORT, ROLECARD_MCP_GATEWAY_WS_URL, ROLECARD_MCP_HTTP_PORT, ROLECARD_MCP_ROLES_DIR, ROLECARD_MCP_STATE_DIR
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for ROLECARD_MCP_GATEWAY_SECRET, ROLECARD_MCP_TOKEN and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-10 and scored it 93/100 (Verified). It did what it claims and nothing else we could detect: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 23 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
3.1sprocessdependency install exit 0
23sclaimed6 tools: role_list, role_get, role_set_current, role_clear_current, role_sections, role_context_render
23sprocessscript backend runs setup only
23sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

No findings across 4,201 lines in 25 files.

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈38 tok
1 file · 25 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈321 tok
6 tools · 54 per tool
Handshake
390 ms
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
3
description under 20 chars · avg 23

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.