rewe-mcp@0.1.0
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "Enables users to search supermarkets, browse weekly discounts and brochures, search products and recipes, inspect digital receipts and online orders, check Bonus balances and coupons, manage favorites and Pickup/Delivery baskets, and plan grocery trips." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.- Tested
- 2 of 2 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
MCP_HTTP_AUTH_TOKENREWE_ACCESS_TOKENREWE_OAUTH_SCOPEREWE_REFRESH_TOKENREWE_TOKEN_STORE_AUTHREWE_TOKEN_STORE_URLConfiguration, not credentials: MCP_HTTP_ALLOWED_HOSTS, MCP_HTTP_ALLOWED_ORIGINS, MCP_HTTP_HOST, MCP_HTTP_JSON_RESPONSE, MCP_HTTP_PATH, MCP_HTTP_PORT, MCP_HTTP_SESSION_IDLE_MS, MCP_TRANSPORT, NODE_TEST_CONTEXT, REWE_ACCOUNT_BASE, REWE_CLIENT_ID, REWE_HEADLESS, REWE_MARKET_ID, REWE_MCP_CACHE, REWE_MCP_CACHE_MAX_ENTRIES, REWE_MOBILE_API_BASE, REWE_MSCO_BASE, REWE_MTLS_CERT, REWE_MTLS_KEY, REWE_REDIRECT_URI, REWE_SERVICE_TYPE, REWE_SSO_BASE, REWE_USER_AGENT, REWE_ZIP_CODE- Where it talks to
- rewe.de (its own)
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for MCP_HTTP_AUTH_TOKEN, REWE_ACCESS_TOKEN, REWE_OAUTH_SCOPE, REWE_REFRESH_TOKEN, REWE_TOKEN_STORE_AUTH, REWE_TOKEN_STORE_URL and talks to rewe.de. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-22 and scored it 88/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
`[rewe-mcp] WARNING: tokens written to ${filePath} but chmod 600 failed (${error?.code || error?.message || error}).`Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts."build": "tsc && chmod +x dist/index.js dist/cli.js",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.