reprove@0.1.0
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "Enables a coding agent, over stdio MCP, to scan a project for security flaws, list and explain findings, propose and apply patches, and re-run recorded exploits to prove each fix actually holds on the patched app. Tools include scan_project, list_findings, explain_finding, propose_patch, apply_patch, verify_fix, and full_audit." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
NEXT_PUBLIC_OPENAI_API_KEYOPENAI_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: ALLOWED_ORIGIN, NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_URL, SUPABASE_ANON_KEY, SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso supabase.co, osv.dev — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names supabase.co, osv.dev as well as its own vendor. The guard injects NEXT_PUBLIC_OPENAI_API_KEY, OPENAI_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 74/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Stripe-like API key pattern detected. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
if relpath.endswith((".env", ".env.local", ".env.production")):Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.new_files = {".env.example": example}Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.STRIPE_SECRET_KEY=sk_live_9Zk3mQ7pR2vT5wX8yBFix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.seen: set[str] = set() # per-file: the same secret in .env AND public/config.js are different (severity) findingsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.if (p.suffix.lower() in TEXT_EXTS or fn in {"Dockerfile", ".env", ".env.local",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.if f.path.name.startswith(".env") and not f.path.name.endswith((".example", ".sample", ".template")):Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.".env.production", ".gitignore"}):Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.f"Remove committed {relpath}, add .env.example and .gitignore rules. ROTATE the leaked keys.",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.string in a server-side .env is normal.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."Delete the file, purge it from git history (git filter-repo or BFG), add `.env` to "Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# 2. committed .env --------------------------------------------------------Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.if gi is None or ".env" not in gi.split("\n"):Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.relpath = _location_file(f) or ".env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.".yml", ".toml", ".ini", ".cfg", ".conf", ".env", ".sh", ".bash", ".zsh",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# (e.g. deleting the committed .env) may have closed this one too.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.p = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."Avoid the shell: use array-form exec (`execFile('git', ['log', userRef])` without shell) and "Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.except Exception as e: # an analyzer must never kill the scanFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.("eval()", re.compile(r"(?<![\w.])eval\s*\("), Severity.HIGH),Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
6 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim chaitu0608: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Stripe-like API key pattern detected≈ +4 on the totalNever read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.
- New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Python exec or eval of computed code≈ +2 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.