Skills/Glama/reprove

reprove@0.1.0

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Enables a coding agent, over stdio MCP, to scan a project for security flaws, list and explain findings, propose and apply patches, and re-run recorded exploits to prove each fix actually holds on the patched app. Tools include scan_project, list_findings, explain_finding, propose_patch, apply_patch, verify_fix, and full_audit." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher chaitu0608 · publishing for 2 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 10 h ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
NEXT_PUBLIC_OPENAI_API_KEYOPENAI_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: ALLOWED_ORIGIN, NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_URL, SUPABASE_ANON_KEY, SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso supabase.co, osv.dev — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names supabase.co, osv.dev as well as its own vendor. The guard injects NEXT_PUBLIC_OPENAI_API_KEY, OPENAI_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 74/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Stripe-like API key pattern detected. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/reprove/patch/generator.py:119 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesif relpath.endswith((".env", ".env.local", ".env.production")):Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/reprove/patch/generator.py:103 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesnew_files = {".env.example": example}Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Stripe-like API key pattern detectedcorpus/vuln-node-api/.env:1 · Stripe-like API key pattern detected — possible hardcoded or harvested keySTRIPE_SECRET_KEY=sk_live_9Zk3mQ7pR2vT5wX8yBFix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.
AST03
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/reprove/analyzers/secrets.py:88 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesseen: set[str] = set() # per-file: the same secret in .env AND public/config.js are different (severity) findingsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/reprove/util.py:63 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesif (p.suffix.lower() in TEXT_EXTS or fn in {"Dockerfile", ".env", ".env.local",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/reprove/analyzers/secrets.py:108 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesif f.path.name.startswith(".env") and not f.path.name.endswith((".example", ".sample", ".template")):Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/reprove/util.py:64 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files".env.production", ".gitignore"}):Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/reprove/patch/generator.py:108 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesf"Remove committed {relpath}, add .env.example and .gitignore rules. ROTATE the leaked keys.",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/reprove/analyzers/secrets.py:6 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesstring in a server-side .env is normal.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/reprove/analyzers/secrets.py:122 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"Delete the file, purge it from git history (git filter-repo or BFG), add `.env` to "Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/reprove/analyzers/secrets.py:107 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# 2. committed .env --------------------------------------------------------Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/reprove/patch/generator.py:105 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesif gi is None or ".env" not in gi.split("\n"):Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/reprove/patch/generator.py:96 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesrelpath = _location_file(f) or ".env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/reprove/util.py:35 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files".yml", ".toml", ".ini", ".cfg", ".conf", ".env", ".sh", ".bash", ".zsh",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/reprove/patch/verifier.py:204 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# (e.g. deleting the committed .env) may have closed this one too.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/reprove/util.py:234 · Python subprocess execution detectedp = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python exec or eval of computed codesrc/reprove/analyzers/injection.py:120 · Python exec or eval of computed code"Avoid the shell: use array-form exec (`execFile('git', ['log', userRef])` without shell) and "Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/reprove/util.py:213 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/reprove/scanner.py:60 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesexcept Exception as e: # an analyzer must never kill the scanFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python exec or eval of computed codesrc/reprove/analyzers/injection.py:34 · Python exec or eval of computed code("eval()", re.compile(r"(?<![\w.])eval\s*\("), Severity.HIGH),Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈33 tok
1 file · 61 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

6 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim chaitu0608: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Stripe-like API key pattern detected≈ +4 on the totalNever read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.
  4. New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
  5. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  6. Python exec or eval of computed code≈ +2 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
Publish a new version to Glama, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim chaitu0608Propose a patch to the maintainer