quillpost@0.4.0
VERIFIED· startup onlyPublisher claims: "Enables AI agents to build, check and preview LinkedIn posts using seven structured styles, then publish text, images, documents or link cards to the user's own profile through LinkedIn's official API. Also covers drafts, a local schedule and post history, with publishing, deleting and commenting gated behind an explicit approval flag." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.- Tested
- server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
- Needs
- --client-secret — give it to the server where it runs, through vet-skills run --secrets, so the value never enters the server's environment. Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report.
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
QUILLPOST_OAUTH_URLor--client-secretConfiguration, not credentials: QUILLPOST_API_URL, QUILLPOST_HOME, QUILLPOST_VIDEO_POLL_MS, QUILLPOST_VIDEO_WAIT_MS- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso linkedin.com, a.example, x.example, s.example — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names linkedin.com, a.example, x.example, s.example as well as its own vendor. The guard injects QUILLPOST_OAUTH_URL only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 86/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed (it asks for --client-secret); the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 26 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
console.log(`Queued ${item.id} for ${when.toString()}. It is published when \`quillpost schedule run\` or \`watch\` runs on this machine.`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.console.log("\nTry: quillpost styles news");Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.console.log(`Saved to ${configPath}. Now run: quillpost login`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.const c = spawn(process.execPath, [cli, ...args], { env: { ...env, ...e } });Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.