qrbaton@r1
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "Lets AI agents turn a UPI QR code plus cart details into a single review-and-pay page link that opens GPay, PhonePe or Paytm pre-filled, so a human pays in one tap. Agents can also poll live payment status and set or confirm it, closing the checkout loop with signed webhooks." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
KV_REST_API_TOKENNEXT_PUBLIC_POSTHOG_PROJECT_TOKENQRBATON_TOKENUPSTASH_REDIS_REST_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: CREATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR, KV_REST_API_URL, NEXT_PUBLIC_POSTHOG_HOST, NEXT_RUNTIME, PUBLIC_URL, QRBATON_URL, UPSTASH_REDIS_REST_URL, VERCEL_PROJECT_PRODUCTION_URL- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso blinkit.com, your-deployment.example, pay.example, shop.example, evil.example, viztf.lol, nas.local, db.internal — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names blinkit.com, your-deployment.example, pay.example, shop.example, evil.example, viztf.lol, nas.local, db.internal as well as its own vendor. The guard injects KV_REST_API_TOKEN, NEXT_PUBLIC_POSTHOG_PROJECT_TOKEN, QRBATON_TOKEN, UPSTASH_REDIS_REST_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is qrbaton@r1 safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 89/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
return Response.json({ error: "unauthorized: send Authorization: Bearer <manageToken>" }, { status: 401, headers: NO_STORE });Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.code: JSON.stringify({ mcpServers: { [NAME]: { type: "http", url: `${origin}/mcp` } } }, null, 2),Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.for (const u of ["https://localhost/x", "https://127.0.0.1/x", "https://[::1]/x", "https://10.0.0.5/", "https://router/", "https://nas.local/", "https://db.internal/"]) {Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.