protocolprobe-mcp@r1
CAUTION· install onlyPublisher claims: "ead-only MCP server over ProtocolProbe's public API: dated public-record facts about servers in the official MCP registry (record checks, servers by topic, registry size and daily changes). Needs no key and calls no other server's tools." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
MIN_SECRET_LENGTHConfiguration, not credentials: ENGINE_CAPTURE_TOOLS, ENGINE_FULL_TEXT, PROTOCOLPROBE_API, PROTOCOLPROBE_SELFTEST_STATE_DIR, SystemRoot, XDG_STATE_HOME- Where it talks to
- protocolprobe.com (its own)Also smithery.ai, evil.example, h.example, ok.example, zapier.com, x.example, supabase.co, kp3xq9mztr7wlbyv2.io, example.org, other.example, inference.sh, your.server, schemastore.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names smithery.ai, evil.example, h.example, ok.example, zapier.com, x.example, supabase.co, kp3xq9mztr7wlbyv2.io, example.org, other.example, inference.sh, your.server, schemastore.org as well as its own vendor. The guard injects MIN_SECRET_LENGTH only into requests to protocolprobe.com (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is protocolprobe-mcp@r1 safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-09 and scored it 76/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Hidden zero-width characters detected; Hidden zero-width characters detected; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
assert.equal(safeRemote("file:///etc/passwd"), null);Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.text = String(text).replace(/^/, "");Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.cfg.mcpServers.smithery = { type: "http", url: "https://server.smithery.ai/@smithery/server/mcp" };Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.cfg.mcpServers["evil\u001b[2K\u001b[1A\r\n fake — remote https://ok.example/"] = { command: "node" };Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.assert.equal(commandName("npx -y @scope/pkg"), null);Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.* carries arguments ("npx -y pkg --token=…", "node C:\srv\server.js --key=…") is never printed.Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.return res.replace(/^/, "");Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.cfg.mcpServers.hexpath = { type: "http", url: "https://h.example/mcp/deadbeefcafebabe" };Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.const viaRemote = url ? null : remoteArgOf(def); // `npx mcp-remote <url>`: the package AND the remote it points atFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.* The URL `mcp-remote` is started with (npx mcp-remote https://… --header …). It is an argument, so it is never shownFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.cfg.mcpServers["nameevil"] = { command: "node" }; // right-to-left overrideFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.remote1: { type: "http", url: "https://user:[email protected]/mcp?key=LEAK_QUERY#LEAK_FRAG", headers: { Authorization: "Bearer LEAK_HEADER" } },Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.…le.error(`${a.error}\n${USAGE}`); process.exit(2); } if (a.help) { console.log(`${USAGE}\n\nLists the MCP servers configured on this machine (Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor, VS Code) and, offline, which are in the\nofficial MCP regist…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.assert.equal(/\u001b|\r|/.test(text), false, "raw control characters printed");Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.{ id: 'sensitive-path', re: /(~\/\.ssh|id_rsa|\.aws\/credentials|\/etc\/passwd|\.env\b)/i },Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.// value of an option (`--env-file .env`, `--config cfg.json`), which is a setting, not the server's own fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.attributes: { label: Tool version (npx <tool> --version), placeholder: "0.5.0" }Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.cfg.mcpServers.dated = { type: "http", url: "https://h.example/mcp/2025-06-18" };Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.oneline: { command: "npx -y pkg --token=LEAK_CMDSPACE" },Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.cfg.mcpServers.shortpath = { type: "sse", url: "https://h.example/mcp/s/kP3xQ9mZtRwLbYvL/sse" };Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.assert.ok(text.includes("npx mcp-remote → remote https://server.smithery.ai/@smithery/server/mcp"));Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.for (const s of [c.label, c.detail, c.help.text, c.help.linkLabel]) assert.doesNotMatch(s, /[\u0000-\u001f\u007f-\u009f---]/, `hostile ${i}`);Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.// `npx mcp-remote https://...`) is refused, so the stdio lane cannot be pointed at someone else's server by another route.Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time."https://protocolprobe.com/api/v1?x=1", "https://protocolprobe.com/api/v1#x", "ftp://protocolprobe.com", "file:///etc/passwd",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.….url))], { env: { PATH: process.env.PATH, SystemRoot: process.env.SystemRoot, ...env }, stdio: ["pipe", "pipe", "pipe"] }); } test("bin: the process answers initial…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.// our own fixture through `npx --package <our tarball>` and through a .cmd file: npx, cmd.exe and the server stayed).Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.for (const s of [c.label, c.detail, c.help.text, c.help.linkLabel]) assert.doesNotMatch(s, /[\u0000-\u001f\u007f-\u009f---]/, `hostile ${i}`);Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.test("npx mcp-remote <url>: the URL argument is shortened and matched, never shown as written; other programs' arguments stay hidden", () => {Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.…ld_process\b/, /\brequire\s*\(/, /\beval\s*\(/, /new Function\s*\(/, /\bprocess\.env\.(?!APPDATA\b)/]) assert.equal(bad.test(src), false, `${f} matches ${bad}`); …Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.// reason, never a pass. 0.1.1 counted dim 4 as passed through `npx mcp-remote http://localhost:...` for a server thatFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.const a = d(["-y", "mcp-remote", "https://user:[email protected]/@smithery/server/mcp?key=LEAKQ", "--header", "Authorization:Bearer LEAKH"]);Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.const uses = [...src.matchAll(/process\.env[^\n]*/g)].map((m) => m[0]);Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.sm: { url: "https://user:[email protected]/@smithery/server/mcp?key=LEAKQ" },Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.assert.doesNotMatch(src, /\benv\s*\[|\bprocess\.env\s*\[|Object\.(keys|entries|values)\(\s*process\.env/, file);Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.// whole process tree (taskkill /T /F) while cmd.exe still links it, before the SDK's own kill (which comes 2 s after theFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
4 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim protocolprobe: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Hidden zero-width characters detected≈ +4 on the totalKeep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)≈ +2 on the totalNamespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
- npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- Bidirectional text override characters detected≈ +2 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.