promoshot-mcp@r1
CAUTION· install onlyPublisher claims: "Enables MCP clients and AI agents to author, inspect, validate, and render PromoShot .promo projects over stdio, delegating rendering to the promo CLI." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso githubusercontent.com, example.invalid, huggingface.co, elevenlabs.io, inkscape.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Connect it under the guard. Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is promoshot-mcp@r1 safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 76/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Destructive file system command detected; Destructive file system command detected. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
the same command run again after a kill finishes from thereFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.&"Fix: sudo apt-get install -y mesa-vulkan-drivers libvulkan1"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell./// Phrases that were true once and taught agents wrong after the formatFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.composition". Resolution never refuses: what cannot be honouredFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct./// a test extracts and runs them, so a recipe cannot rot as the formatFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."sudo apt-get install -y mesa-vulkan-drivers libvulkan1",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."sudo apt-get install -y mesa-vulkan-drivers libvulkan1 \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.let flux: Vec<f64> = (0..env.len())Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose./// too (`promo schema`), and two hand-maintained descriptions of one formatFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
4 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim garalex: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.