print-mcp@1.1.0
CAUTION· install onlyPublisher claims: "Enables AI clients to discover LAN printers, print PDFs, Office files, images, web pages and text in one tool call, and diagnose or repair common printing problems with control over borders, color, darkness and quality." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso hp.com, pwg.org, nodejs.org, d-project.com, denso-wave.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Connect it under the guard. Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
What changed since 1.0.1
vet-skills diff print-mcp 1.0.1 1.1.0This version reaches for something 1.0.1 did not: 5 new hosts (d-project.com, denso-wave.com, hp.com, nodejs.org, …). Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
- New hosts
- d-project.com, denso-wave.com, hp.com, nodejs.org, pwg.org
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-10 and scored it 77/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Hidden zero-width characters detected; Hidden zero-width characters detected. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
for (const source of [url, 'http://localhost/', 'http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data']) {Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.…c () => { const { result, job } = await nextJob(printers.mockurf, { content: '\u0E2A\u0E27\u0E31\u0E2A\u0E14\u0E35\u0E04\u0E23\u0E31\u0E1A \u0E01\u0E49\u0E33 \u0E1B\u0E35\u0E48 \u0E24\u0E45\u0E29\u0E35\nhello', footer:…Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.else if (req.url === '/page') { res.writeHead(200, { 'Content-Type': 'text/html' }); res.end('<h1>\u0E2A\u0E27\u0E31\u0E2A\u0E14\u0E35</h1>'); }Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.… are small JavaScript tools saved on this computer (folder tools/ next to config.json) so they can be run again later. The script body is an async function: it gets \`args\`, \`call(toolName, args)\` (runs any print-mcp tool and returns it…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.assert.equal(decodeText(Buffer.from([0xca, 0xc7, 0xd1, 0xca, 0xb4, 0xd5])), '\u0E2A\u0E27\u0E31\u0E2A\u0E14\u0E35', 'TIS-620');Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.const good = s.write(path.join('.codeium', 'windsurf', 'mcp_config.json'), '{}');Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.…wn and csv all render', async () => { for (const [name, body] of [['a.md', '# \u0E2B\u0E31\u0E27\u0E02\u0E49\u0E2D\n\n| a | b |\n|---|---|\n| 1 | 2 |'], ['b.csv', 'x,y\n1,"2,3"'], ['c.log', 'lin…Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.await assert.rejects(run('return require("fs").readFileSync("/etc/passwd")'), /require is not defined/);Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.assert.equal(decodeText(Buffer.from('\u0E2A\u0E27\u0E31\u0E2A\u0E14\u0E35')), '\u0E2A\u0E27\u0E31\u0E2A\u0E14\u0E35');Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.fs.writeFileSync(path.join(work, 'note.txt'), '\u0E2A\u0E27\u0E31\u0E2A\u0E14\u0E35\u0E04\u0E23\u0E31\u0E1A hello\n\u0E1A\u0E23\u0E23\u0E17\u0E31\u0E14\u0E17\u0E35\u0E48\u0E2A\u0E2D\u0E07');Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.…class="sizes">${[6, 8, 10, 12, 16].map(s => `<p style="font-size:${s}pt">${s}pt \u0E20\u0E32\u0E29\u0E32\u0E44\u0E17\u0E22 \u0E01\u0E48\u0E32 \u0E01\u0E49\u0E33 \u0E1B\u0E35\u0E48 \u0E0E\u0E35\u0E01\u0E…Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.…🥇🎯🎵🎶⚽🏀🎮✅❌⚠️❓❗➕➖➡️⬅️⬆️⬇️♻️©️®️™️'.match(/\p{Extended_Pictographic}(?:️)?(?:\p{Extended_Pictographic}️?)*|✅|❌/gu) ?? []; let libs = {}; const loadScript = …Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.const text = fs.readFileSync(file, 'utf8').replace(/^/, '');Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
3 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim kritsanai-krish: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
- URL to the cloud instance metadata address≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Unicode escape sequence detected≈ +2 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
- File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
- Hidden zero-width characters detected≈ +2 on the totalKeep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.