Skills/Glama/predictorlab

predictorlab@0.3.0

CAUTION

Publisher claims: "Self-hosted tabular ML that doesn't lie. Leakage Guard, conformal intervals, profit-optimized thresholds, counterfactuals & instant REST/MCP API." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry GlamaPublisher markivor · joined 0 days agoInstalls 0Last detonated 2 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-06 and scored it 53/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Latin word with Cyrillic or Greek look-alike letters (homoglyph); Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/e2e/e2e_full.py:38 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedbench/run.py:244 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtools/run.py:19 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Latin word with Cyrillic or Greek look-alike letters (homoglyph)DECISIONS.md:43 · Latin word with Cyrillic or Greek look-alike letters (homoglyph)Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsbackend/app/api/setup.py:160 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionfrontend/src/api/client.ts:29 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL using raw IP addressbackend/app/main.py:96 · URL using raw IP address — may bypass domain-based filteringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsbackend/app/config.py:51 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsfrontend/src/pages/Admin.tsx:217 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedbackend/Dockerfile:9 · Destructive file system command detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedbench/run.py:93 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Outbound HTTP to raw IP addressbackend/app/main.py:96 · Outbound HTTP to raw IP address — may bypass domain-based monitoringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsdocker-compose.yml:7 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈36 tok
1 file · 80 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

27 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim markivor: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Outbound HTTP to raw IP address≈ +4 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
  4. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  5. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  6. URL using raw IP address≈ +2 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
Publish a new version to Glama, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim markivorPropose a patch to the maintainer
predictorlab@0.3.0 safety verdict: Caution 53/100 — KillerSkills