Skills/Glama/portgraph

portgraph@0.1.1

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Enables inspecting local listening ports, process owners, Docker mappings, and local LLM signatures, plus looking up or terminating the process that owns a specific port when write access is allowed. Mutating actions require confirmation and are blocked in dry-run mode." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher kanchingyg · publishing for 0 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 4 h ago
$npx skills add portgraph
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Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it under the guard. Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 85/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known package.github/workflows/release.yml:55 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codenpx -y jsr publish --allow-dirtyFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagesrc/lib.rs:476 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code"{GREEN}tip{RESET} npx portgraph who :3000 · npx portgraph --mcp"Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/lib.rs:278 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesmessage: "Refusing to kill the current process (agent/IDE guard)".into(),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagesrc/cli.ts:136 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeprocess.stderr.write("portgraph — npx portgraph | who :PORT | kill :PORT --allow-write | --mcp\n");Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/scanner.ts:147 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesreturn { ok: false, message: "Refusing to kill the current process (agent/IDE guard)" };Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageSKILL.md:8 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code`npx portgraph` · MCP: `npx portgraph --mcp` with tools `get_local_topology`, `who_owns_port`, `kill_port_owner`.Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/cli.ts:136 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesprocess.stderr.write("portgraph — npx portgraph | who :PORT | kill :PORT --allow-write | --mcp\n");Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagesrc/tui.ts:24 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codelines.push(`${GREEN}tip${RESET} npx portgraph who :3000 · npx portgraph --mcp`);Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/cli.ts:128 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesprocess.stderr.write("Read-only: pass --allow-write to kill a port owner.\n");Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/main.rs:97 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes"portgraph {VERSION} — portgraph | who :PORT | kill :PORT --allow-write | --mcp"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/main.rs:77 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeseprintln!("Read-only: pass --allow-write to kill a port owner.");Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
LOW
Unpinned dependency.github/workflows/release.yml:29 · Unpinned dependencynpm install -g npm@latestFix: Pin the exact version (`[email protected]`, `==1.2.3`) so every install gets the bytes that were reviewed.
AST06

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈55 tok
1 file · 23 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.