Skills/Glama/playnice

playnice@0.1.0

VERIFIED· startup only

Publisher claims: "An MCP server that lets an agent drive CLI and TUI programs in a real pseudo-terminal, sending keys, text, mouse events and resizes and getting back text or PNG screenshots it can read. Sessions persist in a background daemon, so one terminal can be driven across many tool calls without restarting." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher paradise-runner · publishing for 1 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 13 h ago
$npx skills add playnice
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Coverage

Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.
Tested
server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it under the guard. Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 90/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 26 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
5.9sprocessdependency install exit 0
26sclaimedstartup only: exited (0) before answering · code: 'ERR_MODULE_NOT_FOUND', url: 'file:///tmp/ks-detonate-Z7EoPM/task/home/work/acme-api/.claude/skills/playnice/dist/cli/index.js' } Node.js v22.23.5
26sprocessscript backend runs setup only
26sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/cli/index.ts:148 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesclose kill a sessionFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification command.github/workflows/test.yml:28 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsrun: chmod +x node_modules/node-pty/prebuilds/*/spawn-helper 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈643 tok
2 files · 45 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.