plants@r1

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Enables Claude to manage a self-hosted plant-care tracker through natural language, including adding plants, calculating watering and feeding schedules for the user's climate, logging care, snoozing plants, and attaching photos." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher ahaverty · publishing for 2 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 36 h ago

$npx skills add plants

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Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.

Tested: every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested: use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for: no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to: no vendor host named in the codeAlso homeassistant.local, open-meteo.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw: no credential files read · no network
What we could not test: use of the skill by an agent

Connect it under the guard. Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is plants@r1 safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 88/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations

t+CategoryObserved action

0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle

0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only

0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM

Access to sensitive file pathsdocker-compose.yml:1 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Plants tracker. Copy .env.example to .env and fill it in, then: docker compose up -d --buildFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.

AST05

MEDIUM

Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:5 · Destructive file system command detected&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.

AST05

MEDIUM

Access to sensitive file pathsdocker-compose.yml:12 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.

AST05

MEDIUM

Python subprocess execution detectedworker/photo_worker.py:115 · Python subprocess execution detectedp = subprocess.run(cmd, input=json.dumps(msg) + "\n", capture_output=True, text=True, encoding="utf-8",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.

AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded

≈31 tok

1 file · 27 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.