Skills/Glama/planboard

planboard@0.7.1

VERIFIED· startup only

Publisher claims: "Enables reviewing agent-authored Markdown plans in a local browser with interactive diagrams, anchored feedback, revision comparison, and approval of an exact version before implementation." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher lucapohl-angel · publishing for 3 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 3d ago
$npx skills add planboard
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Coverage

Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.
Tested
server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it under the guard. Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 84/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 24 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
4.0sprocessdependency install exit 0
24sclaimedstartup only: exited (0) before answering · code: 'ERR_MODULE_NOT_FOUND', url: 'file:///tmp/ks-detonate-IDDfkr/task/home/work/acme-api/.claude/skills/@koboimomo/planboard/web/diagram-walkthroughs.js' } Node.js v22.23.4
24sprocessscript backend runs setup only
24sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiontests/discussions.test.mjs:4 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files…ype':'application/json'},body:JSON.stringify(data)});const result=await response.json();if(response.ok){await board.deliver(r.id);const latest=await board.store.read(r.id);result.question=latest.discussions.find(q=>q.id===result.question.i…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/fast-review.mjs:37 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconst schema=path.join(dir,'schema.json'),output=path.join(dir,'answer.json');await writeFile(schema,JSON.stringify(fastSchema),{mode:0o600});Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known package.github/workflows/ci.yml:20 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code- run: npx playwright install --with-deps chromiumFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/check-release.mjs:7 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst forbidden=/(^|\/)(node_modules|artifacts|coverage|test-results|playwright-report|\.formative|\.pi|\.impeccable|\.local)(\/|$)|(^|\/)\.env(?:\.|$)|\.tgz$|^examples\/(syntact|real-world)\//;Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/check-release.mjs:9 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesif(forbidden.test(file)&&!file.endsWith('.env.example'))errors.push(`Private/generated path: ${file}`);Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈6,057 tok
1 file · 80 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.