pihole-mcp@r1
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "Enables an agent to manage a Pi-hole v6 instance through its FTL REST API, covering status and stats, query logs, allow/deny lists, groups, clients, local DNS and CNAME records, DHCP reservations, and config edits, with read-only and safety guardrails." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
PIHOLE_PASSWORD_FILEConfiguration, not credentials: PIHOLE_READ_ONLY, PIHOLE_SKIP_WRITE, PIHOLE_TIMEOUT, PIHOLE_URL- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso pi.hole — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names pi.hole as well as its own vendor. The guard injects PIHOLE_PASSWORD_FILE only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is pihole-mcp@r1 safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-08 and scored it 82/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
summary: Application session without sudo modeFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.summary: Application session without sudo modeFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.kill "$WATCHDOG_PID" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.chmod 700 "$STAGE_DIR"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.docker run -i --rm \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# works for processes we do not own, where `kill -0` would also report EPERM.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.summary: Application session without sudo modeFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.summary: Application session without sudo modeFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.