pid-ref@r1
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "Enables LLMs and MCP clients to search a P&ID/process scheme symbol reference, retrieve full symbol cards, and decode instrument tags using GOST and ISA letter codes. It provides read-only access to 834 symbols with SVG assets, standards metadata, usage guidance, common mistakes, and similar-symbol links." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
EDIT_PASSWORD- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso wikimedia.org, ibiblio.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names wikimedia.org, ibiblio.org as well as its own vendor. The guard injects EDIT_PASSWORD only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is pid-ref@r1 safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 89/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
subprocess.run(["pdftocairo", "-svg", "-f", str(page), "-l", str(page), pdf, f"{tmp}/p.svg"], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["pdftoppm", "-r", str(DPI), "-f", str(page), "-l", str(page), "-gray", "-png", pdf, f"{tmp}/p"], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.xml = subprocess.run(["pdftotext", "-bbox-layout", "-f", str(page), "-l", str(page), pdf, "-"],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."""MCP-сервер справочника. Запуск: python mcp_server.py — stdio; python mcp_server.py 8081 — HTTP на http://<хост>:8081/mcp"""Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.