Skills/Glama/pi-mcp

pi-mcp@0.1.0

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Enables running and supervising pi coding agents over RPC, with hot resume, cold resurrection from session files, sandboxed execution, lifecycle counters, and log/artifact inspection." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher sr9000 · publishing for 6 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 6d ago
$npx skills add pi-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
PI_MCP_ACCESS_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: PI_MCP_AGENTS_DIR, PI_MCP_BWRAP, PI_MCP_CHILD_MCP, PI_MCP_DB, PI_MCP_MODEL, PI_MCP_PI_BIN, PI_MCP_PROVIDER, PI_MCP_REFRESH_PAUSE, PI_MCP_RPC_TIMEOUT
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for PI_MCP_ACCESS_TOKEN and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-08 and scored it 81/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_mounts.py:209 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:17 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions&& chown -R pi:pi /app /dataFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_e2e_container.py:32 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(args, check=True, cwd=REPO)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:5 · Destructive file system command detected&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/container_mount_edgecases.py:85 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_fake.py:8 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/pi_mcp/rpc.py:76 · Python subprocess execution detectedself._process = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_artifacts.py:144 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesartifacts.run_grep(tmp_root, ["x"], path="/etc/passwd")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)tests/test_mcp.py:460 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkassert config["mcpServers"]["pi-mcp"]["url"].startswith("http://127.0.0.1:")Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/pi_mcp/sandbox.py:33 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"/etc/passwd",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_mounts.py:247 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_mounts.py:273 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/pi_mcp/artifacts/grep.py:48 · Python subprocess execution detectedcompleted = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_mounts.py:312 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(cage, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=15, check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈30 tok
1 file · 79 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

pi-mcp@0.1.0 safety verdict: Verified (not started) — KillerSkills