pi-femboy-mcp@0.1.0
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "It enables clients to manage a shared virtual companion state—outfits, mood, memories, achievements, toasts, and terminal presence—through reactive MCP resources, tools, and prompts. It also supports background mood decay, gated wardrobe unlocks, and multi-window synchronization with offline fallback." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
FEMBOY_ALLOW_LOCAL_UNAUTHFEMBOY_SECRETor--allow-local-unauthConfiguration, not credentials: FEMBOY_CONFIG, FEMBOY_DB_PATH, FEMBOY_HOST, FEMBOY_HTTP_PATH, FEMBOY_LOG_LEVEL, FEMBOY_PORT, FEMBOY_READY_FILE, FEMBOY_SESSION_IDLE_MS, FEMBOY_SWEEP_MS, FEMBOY_TICK_ENABLED, FEMBOY_TICK_MS, FEMBOY_TRANSPORT- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for FEMBOY_ALLOW_LOCAL_UNAUTH, FEMBOY_SECRET and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 89/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
npx tsc --noEmit -p tsconfig.jsonFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.{ env: { ...process.env, FEMBOY_HOST: '127.0.0.1', FEMBOY_READY_FILE: readyPath, ...env }, stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'] },Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.npx tsc --noEmit -p tsconfig.test.jsonFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.ФазaFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.