Skills/Glama/pdfport

pdfport@0.1.0

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Enables extracting text and metadata from local PDF files, inspecting page and file information, merging multiple PDFs, and splitting PDFs into single-page documents through MCP tools." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher cloudcorprecords · publishing for 8 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 3d ago
$npx skills add pdfport
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Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it under the guard. Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 84/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/cli.ts:58 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(JSON.stringify(await port.mergePdfs(inputs, outputFile), null, 2));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
URL with embedded credentialspackage.json:1 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking…ipt":"^5"},"engines":{"node":">=20"},"files":["dist","server.json"],"homepage":"https://github.com/CloudCorpRecords/pdfport#readme","license":"MIT","mcpName":"io.github.CloudCorpRecords/pdfport","name":"@reneturcios/pdfport","private":fals…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈36 tok
1 file · 20 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.