pagey@1.0.3
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "This server empowers conversational AI to generate and deploy static websites directly to a hosting service. It facilitates real-time publishing, allows for seamless content updates, and provides integrated visitor analytics." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
MIN_SECRET_LENGTHOAUTH_ACCESS_TOKEN_TTLOAUTH_REFRESH_TOKEN_TTLPAGEY_API_TOKENPAGEY_MCP_SECRETPAGEY_TOKEN_URLConfiguration, not credentials: DATA_DIR, E2E_SUBDOMAIN, LOG_TO_STDERR, MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES, MCP_BASE_URL, MCP_BODY_LIMIT, PAGEY_API_URL, PAGEY_SITE_DOMAIN, PAGEY_SITE_PROTOCOL, PUBLIC_BASE_URL, SMOKE_CREATE, TRUST_PROXY- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso pagey.site — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names pagey.site as well as its own vendor. The guard injects MIN_SECRET_LENGTH, OAUTH_ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL, OAUTH_REFRESH_TOKEN_TTL, PAGEY_API_TOKEN, PAGEY_MCP_SECRET, PAGEY_TOKEN_URL only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 80/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
- .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.autocapitalize="none" autocomplete="off" placeholder="Paste your token" required>Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.&& mkdir -p /data && chown -R pagey:pagey /data /appFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.[".env", /Hidden/],Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.