Skills/Glama/oyee

oyee@r1

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Enables AI agents and MCP clients to send, update, and resolve live actionable notifications across Android, macOS, and the web, including asking questions and waiting for user replies. Supports targeting one device or all devices and syncing responses across devices." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher nishkalkashyap · publishing for 2 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 40 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso workers.dev, picsum.photos — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it under the guard. Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is oyee@r1 safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-12 and scored it 72/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file paths.agents/skills/wizard/SKILL.md:20 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- For setup: `.env`, `.env.example`, `.env.*`, `README`, `docker-compose*`, framework config, and `.github/workflows/*` (every `secrets.*` / `vars.*` reference is a value the wizard must produce).Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files.agents/skills/setup-ts-deep-modules/SKILL.md:93 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files…Keep it to the copy-me snippet plus the four rules in one paragraph each. Then add a **context pointer** to it from the repo's agent-instructions file (`CLAUDE.md` if present, else `AGENTS.md`, creating `AGENTS.md` if neither exists). One …Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
File permission modification command.agents/skills/wizard/SKILL.md:42 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions- `chmod +x <script>`.Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known package.agents/skills/setup-pre-commit/SKILL.md:32 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codenpx husky initFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file paths.agents/skills/wizard/SKILL.md:10 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files…s, cross-platform URL opening (including WSL), hidden secret entry, idempotent `.env` upserts, `gh secret`/`gh variable` writes, and a closing summary. **Your job i…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known package.agents/skills/setup-pre-commit/SKILL.md:42 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codenpx lint-stagedFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload action.agents/skills/writing-for-agents/SKILL.md:79 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files…se, never the meaning.) - The **environment** is a source of truth too (`package.json` scripts, config files, the directory layout, `--help` output), and a document that restates it is a **cache**: a copy of a lookup, earning i…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agent.agents/skills/wayfinder/SKILL.md:52 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentsee "Out of scope": work ruled beyond the destination; closed, never graduatesFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionapps/server/src/inbox/do.ts:817 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files? resolveTargets(await listDevices(this.env.DB, actor.userId), input)Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionapps/server/src/inbox/do.ts:447 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files? resolveTargets(await listDevices(this.env.DB, actor.userId), input)Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file paths.agents/skills/ask-matt/SKILL.md:90 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files…ctive bash script that opens each URL, captures each value, and writes it into `.env` and GitHub secrets, so the procedure stops being something you re-explain to a…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file paths.agents/skills/wizard/SKILL.md:8 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files…ly what to click and copy, captures the values, writes them where they belong (`.env`, GitHub secrets), confirms at every stage, and shows how many stages are left.…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification command.agents/skills/git-guardrails-claude-code/SKILL.md:35 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsMake it executable with `chmod +x`.Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionapps/server/src/inbox/do.ts:737 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files? resolveTargets(await listDevices(this.env.DB, actor.userId), input)Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files.agents/skills/setup-matt-pocock-skills/SKILL.md:69 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files- The `## Agent skills` block to add to whichever of `CLAUDE.md` / `AGENTS.md` is being edited (see step 4 for selection rules)Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known package.agents/skills/setup-pre-commit/SKILL.md:79 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code- [ ] Run `npx lint-staged` to verify it worksFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
CRITICAL
Fake instruction boundary tagdocs/agents/domain.md:9 · Fake instruction boundary tag- **`docs/adr/`**: read ADRs that touch the area you're about to work in. In multi-context repos, also check `src/<context>/docs/adr/` for context-scoped decisions.Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈42,502 tok
38 files · 80 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

8 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim nishkalkashyap: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  5. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  6. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
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