Skills/Glama/openosint

openosint@2.36.1

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "Exposes an OSINT investigation toolkit to any MCP-compatible AI client, which can drive passive checks such as DNS, WHOIS/RDAP, breach, IP reputation, GitHub and news-geo lookups and chain findings across them. The server lists 20 tools by default (16 passive plus 4 graph and batch helpers) and 25 when active checks are explicitly allowed, running via uvx with no separate install." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry GlamaPublisher kush-coder · publishing for 2 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 8 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
DATABASE_URLGITHUB_CLIENT_SECRETGITHUB_TOKENGOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRETOPENOSINT_SETUP_TOKENSESSION_SECRET_KEY or --save-with-tokenConfiguration, not credentials: CHROME, CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY, FFMPEG_BIN, GIFSICLE_BIN, GITHUB_CLIENT_ID, GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID, OPENOSINT_DEMO_DIR, OPENOSINT_DEMO_KEY, OPENOSINT_DEMO_SCENARIO, OPENOSINT_DEMO_URL, OPENOSINT_DEMO_ZOOM, OPENOSINT_MODEL, OPENOSINT_OLLAMA_HOST, OPENOSINT_PROVIDER, PLATFORM_BURST_MAX_CALLS, PLATFORM_BURST_WINDOW_SECS, POSTER_PATH, WAITLIST_RATE_MAX_CALLS, WAITLIST_RATE_WINDOW_SECS, WEBM_PATH
Where it talks to
openosint.tech (its own)Also google.com, sitemaps.org, evil.example, pypistats.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
nothing has run yet
What we could not test
everything: the server has not run yet

Run it before you trust it. Nothing has run yet: the code was read, the server was not. `vet-skills try` runs this exact version in the honeypot in about a minute.

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 60/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:9 · Destructive file system command detected&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagescripts/record_web_demo.mjs:7 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code* npx playwright install chromiumFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/build_site.py:96 · Python subprocess execution detectedout = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsDockerfile:34 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# such a file exists, so the "Loaded .env" line only appears once there really is one.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/ci/smoke_install.py:85 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["taskkill", "/T", "/F", "/PID", str(proc.pid)], capture_output=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/record_web_demo.mjs:129 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`[+] Done: ${OUTPUT_GIF}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageMakefile:51 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code@cd scripts/record-demo && npx playwright install chromium --quiet 2>&1 | grep -v "Downloading\|[0-9]%" || trueFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/record-demo/record.mjs:181 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`[*] Waiting for ${NODE_THRESHOLD_FINAL} nodes post-pivot (up to 20s)…`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/ci/smoke_install.py:46 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(["uv", *args], capture_output=True, text=True, check=True).stdout.strip()Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/record_web_demo.mjs:53 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`[*] Output: ${OUTPUT_GIF}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageMakefile:28 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code@cd scripts/record-demo && npx playwright install chromium --quiet 2>&1 | grep -v "Downloading\|[0-9]%" || trueFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/ci/smoke_install.py:97 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsDockerfile:37 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesCMD ["sh", "-c", "ln -sf /data/.env /app/.env && exec openosint web --host 0.0.0.0 --port 8080 --no-browser --allow-remote"]Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/ci/smoke_install.py:239 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/record-demo/record.mjs:200 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`[+] Poster written: ${POSTER_PATH}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsDockerfile:32 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# /app/.env stays a symlink into the data volume so a /data/.env from an olderFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/render_favicons.py:60 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈39 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

20 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim kush-coder: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
  3. Destructive file system command detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  5. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  6. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
Publish a new version to Glama, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim kush-coderPropose a patch to the maintainer