openclaim-mcp@r1
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "Provides AI clients with public breach-response guidance, scenario choices, official links, and blank inquiry, compensation, or mediation templates, while avoiding reading or returning personal data documents." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
OPENCLAIM_MCP_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: OPENCLAIM_TEST_BINARY- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso go.kr, or.kr, evil.invalid, example.invalid — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names go.kr, or.kr, evil.invalid, example.invalid as well as its own vendor. The guard injects OPENCLAIM_MCP_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is openclaim-mcp@r1 safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-12 and scored it 90/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
p = subprocess.Popen([binary], stdin=subprocess.PIPE, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.p = subprocess.Popen([binary,"--http"],env={**os.environ,"OPENCLAIM_MCP_TOKEN":token},stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,stderr=subprocess.PIPE,text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.descriptor = json.loads(subprocess.check_output([binary,"--describe"], text=True))Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.