Skills/Glama/okf

okf@r1

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Enables an AI assistant to read and write a git-versioned personal markdown knowledge base through MCP tools, with deterministic validation, lifecycle enforcement, local hybrid search, and corpus auditing." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher sumit-anfy · publishing for 3 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 3d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
OKF_AUTH_TOKENOKF_GITHUB_CLIENT_SECRETOKF_WEB_PASSWORDConfiguration, not credentials: OKF_CHUNK_INLINE_MAX, OKF_CODEGRAPH_DIR, OKF_DEPLOY_GATE, OKF_DEPLOY_HEALTH, OKF_EMB_BATCH, OKF_EMB_CACHE, OKF_EMB_MODEL, OKF_FINDABILITY, OKF_FINDABILITY_BANK, OKF_FINDABILITY_PROJECT, OKF_GIT_COMMIT, OKF_GIT_PUSH, OKF_GIT_PUSH_ASYNC, OKF_GITHUB_ALLOWED_USERS, OKF_GITHUB_CLIENT_ID, OKF_HOST, OKF_NODE_INLINE_MAX, OKF_PORT, OKF_PUBLIC_URL, OKF_RATIFIED_SCOPE_NODE, OKF_ROOT, OKF_SEARCH_LOG, OKF_SEMANTIC, OKF_TRANSPORT
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for OKF_AUTH_TOKEN, OKF_GITHUB_CLIENT_SECRET, OKF_WEB_PASSWORD and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is okf@r1 safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 75/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Privileged sudo command; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathslibrarian/config.py:8 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files`.env.example` lists every variable.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commanddeploy/okf-deploy.sh:84 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegeshead_ts=$(sudo -u okf git -C "$CORPUS" log -1 --format=%ct HEAD 2>/dev/null) || return 0Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathslibrarian/config.py:1 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Where settings come from: the process environment, then a `.env` file.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commanddeploy/okf-deploy.sh:79 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesahead=$(sudo -u okf git -C "$CORPUS" rev-list --count "origin/$CORPUS_BRANCH..HEAD" 2>/dev/null) || return 0Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commanddeploy/okf-deploy.sh:95 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesif sudo -u okf flock -x -w 30 "$CORPUS/.okf.lock" \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commanddeploy/okf-deploy.sh:73 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo -u okf git -C "$CORPUS" fetch -q origin "$CORPUS_BRANCH" 2>/dev/null || {Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commanddeploy/okf-deploy.sh:105 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges"sudo -u okf git -C $CORPUS pull --rebase origin $CORPUS_BRANCH && ... push"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_audit_sync.py:133 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["git", "init", "-b", "master", str(repo)], capture_output=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_store.py:963 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(root), *args],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsserver.py:11 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesEnv (also read from a .env beside this file; see .env.example): OKF_ROOTFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedlibrarian/audit.py:175 · Python subprocess execution detectedr = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_async_push.py:31 · Python subprocess execution detectedr = subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(repo), *args],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedlibrarian/store.py:135 · Python subprocess execution detectedr = subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(root), "status", "--porcelain", "--", "*.md"],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_audit_sync.py:55 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["git", "clone", str(remote), str(c)], capture_output=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_audit_destructive.py:140 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(repo), "commit", "-m", "okf: delete node"],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_audit_sync.py:26 · Python subprocess execution detectedr = subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(repo), *args],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandserver.py:34 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# every code change) can kill a push in flight, leaving a committed-but-unpushedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_audit_sync.py:43 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["git", "init", "--bare", "-b", "master", str(remote)],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_async_push.py:42 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["git", "init", "--bare", "-b", "master", str(remote)],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_audit_destructive.py:35 · Python subprocess execution detectedr = subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(repo), *args],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedlibrarian/store.py:461 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(root), *args],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathslibrarian/config.py:25 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filespath = path or CODE_ROOT / ".env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_async_push.py:282 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["git", "clone", str(remote), str(other)], capture_output=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_async_push.py:45 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["git", "clone", str(remote), str(work)], capture_output=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_audit_destructive.py:46 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_retrieval_semantic.py:602 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesfor bad in ("../etc/passwd", "a/b", "a finance app", "ledger.html", "x" * 65, "", None):Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_audit_sync.py:46 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["git", "clone", str(remote), str(seed)], capture_output=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedlibrarian/store.py:344 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(root), *args],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_audit_destructive.py:59 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["git", "init", "-b", "master", str(r)], capture_output=True, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_async_push.py:205 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["git", "clone", str(remote), str(other)], capture_output=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedlibrarian/audit.py:97 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(root), *args],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathslibrarian/config.py:10 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files`load_env()` reads `KEY=value` lines from `.env` beside the code. A variableFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈33 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

5 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim sumit-anfy: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  5. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
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