Skills/Glama/office-gateway

office-gateway@0.1.0

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Enables AI agents to route Office and PDF tasks through a single MCP interface, including Word/Excel/PowerPoint reads and edits, zero-loss Excel XML edits, PPTX/DOCX generation, Markdown-to-Word conversion, and multi-strategy PDF parsing, while enforcing workspace and write-safety gates." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher jerryxugit-2026 · publishing for 1 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 23 h ago
$npx skills add office-gateway
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Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso openxmlformats.org, microsoft.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it under the guard. Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 81/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedserver.py:280 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run([sys.executable, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), 'engines', 'xlsx', 'xlsx_pack.py'), unpack_dir, file_path], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedengines/xlsx/libreoffice_recalc.py:74 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedengines/xlsx/xlsx_insert_row.py:169 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedengines/xlsx/libreoffice_recalc.py:135 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedengines/xlsx/xlsx_reader.py:17 · Destructive file system command detected1 — file not found / unsupported format / encoding failureFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandengines/xlsx/libreoffice_recalc.py:234 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesprint(" Linux: sudo apt-get install -y libreoffice")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedserver.py:306 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedserver.py:258 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run([sys.executable, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), 'engines', 'xlsx', 'xlsx_unpack.py'), file_path, unpack_dir], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedserver.py:143 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedserver.py:314 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandengines/xlsx/libreoffice_recalc.py:105 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges" Linux: sudo apt-get install -y libreoffice"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈44 tok
1 file · 18 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.