Skills/Glama/nutho-preset-editor

nutho-preset-editor@1.1.0

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "It enables AI agents and browser-based users to inspect, edit, validate, reorder, diff, and safely persist SillyTavern Chat Completion presets through revision-safe live synchronization over stdio or HTTP." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher nattaphat010447 · publishing for 1 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 20 h ago
$npx skills add nutho-preset-editor
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Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
NUTHO_MCP_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: NUTHO_PRESET_ROOTS
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for NUTHO_MCP_TOKEN and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 89/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

LOW
Prompt injectionsrc/client/default-preset.json:77 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file"identifier": "jailbreak"Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectionsrc/client/default-preset.json:228 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file"identifier": "jailbreak",Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectionREADME.th.md:148 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file| `reset_prompt` | คืนค่า built-in prompt (main, nsfw, jailbreak, enhanceDefinitions) |Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/client/app.css:84 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files.json-input{flex:1;min-height:280px;resize:none;padding:14px;font:12px/1.65 var(--mono);white-space:pre;tab-size:4}Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/server/preset-session-service.js:22 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconst name = addExtension ? `${trimmed}.json` : input;Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
LOW
Prompt injectionREADME.md:148 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file| `reset_prompt` | Restore a built-in prompt (main, nsfw, jailbreak, enhanceDefinitions). |Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectionsrc/client/default-preset.json:175 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file"identifier": "jailbreak",Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/server.test.js:120 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files'/../file-io.js', '/./file-io.js', '/sub/../file-io.js', '/.env', '/.git/config',Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈44 tok
1 file · 46 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.