Skills/Glama/nuncius

nuncius@0.4.0

CAUTION· startup only

Publisher claims: "Enables Claude Code, Codex, and Cursor to delegate self-contained coding tasks to one another on the user's own subscriptions, with each task isolated in a git worktree and sandbox, usage tracked, budgets enforced, and results returned for review." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher sdirkse · publishing for 1 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 13 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.
Tested
server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso apple.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it under the guard. Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 68/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Privileged sudo command. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 20 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
20sclaimedstartup only: exited (0) before answering · Every task runs in its own git worktree (branch nuncius/<target>/<id>) inside a sandbox; the nuncius commits the result there and prints how to review and apply it. Nothing is merged for you. Exit codes: 0 ok · 2 usage error · 3 refused (budget or nested nuncius call) · 124 timeout · otherwise the tool's exit code. Data: /tmp/ks-detonate-YnvAeu/task/home/.nuncius/usage.jsonl
20sprocessscript backend runs setup only
20sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/sandbox.js:151 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// so ignored files like .env stay closed), the keychain folder (the CLIs' logins), Codex's loginFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/task-accounts/prove.sh:51 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsmkdir "$WORK/task" && chgrp _nuncius "$WORK/task" && chmod 2770 "$WORK/task"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/evidence.js:48 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// the target planted (e.g. `.cursor` -> ~/.ssh), or nothing under it is collected.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/task-accounts/prove.sh:70 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesif sudo -n /sbin/pfctl -a com.apple/250.nuncius -s rules >/dev/null 2>&1 || true; then :; fiFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/sandbox.js:131 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files'.ssh', '.aws', '.gnupg', '.config/gh', '.config/gcloud', '.azure', '.kube', '.docker', '.netrc', '.npmrc', '.pypirc',Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsrc/accounts.js:44 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesif (r.status !== 0) return `cannot switch to task account ${a} without a password: the sudo rule from scripts/task-accounts/setup.sh is missing`;Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsrc/accounts.js:7 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges// account, through the sudo rule setup installs.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/task-accounts/undo.sh:6 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges# It stops the task accounts' processes, then removes the firewall rules, the sudo rule, theFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/task-accounts/setup.sh:5 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges# sudo ./scripts/task-accounts/setup.sh --no-firewall # the same without the pf firewall rulesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/accounts.js:97 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst all = { ...env, ...secrets };Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/task-accounts/setup.sh:125 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesvisudo -cf "$tmp" >/dev/null || { rm -f "$tmp"; fail "the sudo rule did not validate"; }Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/task-accounts/undo.sh:4 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges# sudo ./scripts/task-accounts/undo.shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
CRITICAL
OS command execution function call detectedhooks/require-nuncius.js:81 · OS command execution function call detected// Words in code or text, split finely enough that `os.system('nuncius setup')` yields nuncius, setup.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/task-accounts/prove.sh:14 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesas() { sudo -n -u "$U" -- "$@"; }Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandhooks/require-nuncius.js:265 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges// `nuncius` (`sudo -u nuncius codex ...` must not pass). Agents call `nuncius codex ...` unwrapped.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/task-accounts/undo.sh:13 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesSUDOERS=/etc/sudoers.d/nunciusFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/task-accounts/setup.sh:4 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges# sudo ./scripts/task-accounts/setup.sh # accounts, sudo rule, home pass-through, firewallFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/task-accounts/undo.sh:21 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges{ [ -n "$OWNER" ] && [ "$OWNER" != root ]; } || { echo "run it with sudo from your own account, not as root" >&2; exit 1; }Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configurationsrc/runners/cursor.js:32 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtime// --disable-auto-update (a hidden option, in the CLI since at least 2026.10.16): without it CursorFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedscripts/task-accounts/undo.sh:57 · Destructive file system command detected[ -d /var/db/nuncius-homes ] && [ ! -L /var/db/nuncius-homes ] && rm -rf /var/db/nuncius-homes && say "removed the task accounts' home folders"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/task-accounts/setup.sh:38 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges{ [ -n "$OWNER" ] && [ "$OWNER" != root ]; } || fail "run it with sudo from your own account, not as root"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/task-accounts/prove.sh:44 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo -n -u "$U" /usr/bin/pkill -KILL -u "$U"; sleep 1Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/task-accounts/setup.sh:14 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesSUDOERS=/etc/sudoers.d/nunciusFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/task-accounts/prove.sh:18 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo -n -u "$U" true 2>/dev/null || { echo "cannot switch to $U: run setup.sh first"; exit 1; }Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/task-accounts/undo.sh:41 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessay "removed the sudo rule"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/doctor.js:19 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst SECRET_PROBES = ['.ssh', '.aws', '.gnupg', '.config/gh', '.netrc', '.npmrc', '.zsh_history', '.bash_history', '.gitconfig', 'Library/Cookies'];Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsrc/doctor.js:137 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesadd('the accounts, the sudo rule and the home pass-through are in place', !problem, problem);Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Privileged sudo commandtest/nuncius.test.js:119 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges'env -i codex exec hi', 'env -u HOME codex exec hi', 'sudo -u bob codex exec hi', 'nice -n 10 codex exec hi',Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/task-accounts/setup.sh:160 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 0644 "$PLIST"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Privileged sudo commandtest/nuncius.test.js:125 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges…ex login', 'cursor-agent status', 'grep codex README.md', 'echo cursor-agent', 'sudo codex --version', 'npx @openai/codex login', 'claude', 'claude mcp list', 'claud…Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/task-accounts/prove.sh:38 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill "$mine" 2>/dev/nullFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/task-accounts/prove.sh:58 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod -R go+rX "$REPO"; chmod o+x "$WORK"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/task-accounts/prove.sh:59 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsgit -C "$REPO" worktree add -q "$WORK/task/wt" -b t 2>/dev/null; chgrp -R _nuncius "$WORK/task/wt"; chmod -R g+rwX "$WORK/task/wt"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/task-accounts/prove.sh:74 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill "$lis" 2>/dev/nullFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/doctor.js:89 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesconst sig = underProfile(profileFile, `kill -0 ${outsidePid} 2>/dev/null && echo SIGNALED || echo denied`);Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstest/nuncius.test.js:31 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesspawnSync('node', [path.join(root, 'bin', 'nuncius.js'), ...args], { env: { ...env, ...extraEnv }, cwd: repo, encoding: 'utf8' });Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstest/hardening.test.js:33 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesspawnSync(process.execPath, [path.join(root, 'bin', 'nuncius.js'), ...args], { env: { ...env, ...extraEnv }, cwd, encoding: 'utf8' });Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstest/isolation.test.js:31 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesspawnSync('node', [path.join(root, 'bin', 'nuncius.js'), ...args], { env: { ...env, ...extraEnv }, cwd, encoding: 'utf8' });Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
OS command execution function call detectedtest/hardening.test.js:810 · OS command execution function call detected["python3 \\ #<<EOF\nimport os; os.system('nuncius setup')\nEOF", 'nuncius settings'],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstest/hardening.test.js:194 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv: { ...env, CLAUDECODE: '1' }, cwd: repo, encoding: 'utf8', stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'],Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/doctor.js:85 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesconst lis = underProfile(profileFile, `/usr/bin/nc -l 0.0.0.0 ${port} 2>${sh(errFile)} & p=$!; sleep 1; if kill -0 $p 2>/dev/null; then kill $p; echo LISTENING; else cat ${sh(errFile)}; fi`);Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/task-accounts/prove.sh:52 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod g+x "$WORK" && chgrp _nuncius "$WORK"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Privileged sudo commandtest/hardening.test.js:762 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges['sudo nuncius uninstall-hook', 'nuncius settings'],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstest/mcp.test.js:232 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst cli = spawnSync('node', [path.join(root, 'bin', 'nuncius.js'), 'codex', 'x'], { env: { ...env, NUNCIUS_DEPTH: '1' }, cwd: repo, encoding: 'utf8' });Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/task-accounts/setup.sh:159 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschown root:wheel "$PLIST"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiontest/accounts.test.js:66 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files…>/dev/null 2>&1 && echo git-ok; cat "' + path.join(os.homedir(), '.codex', 'auth.json') + '" >/dev/null 2>&1 && echo LOGIN-READ || echo login-denied; } > who.txt\necho \'{"type":"turn.completed","usage":{"input_tokens":1,"output_tokens":1}…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstest/mcp.test.js:36 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesserver = spawn('node', [path.join(root, 'bin', 'nuncius.js'), 'mcp'], { env: { ...env, ...extraEnv }, cwd: repo });Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/sandbox.js:241 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes// Signals only within this sandbox: a target cannot kill nuncius's worker (which enforces itsFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/task-accounts/undo.sh:45 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod -a "group:$GROUP allow search" "$OWNER_HOME"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/task-accounts/setup.sh:112 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 700 "$d"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Privileged sudo commandtest/nuncius.test.js:123 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges'timeout 1.5m codex exec hi', 'timeout inf codex exec hi', 'nice --adjustment 5 codex exec hi', 'xargs --max-args 1 codex exec', 'sudo -u nuncius codex exec hi', 'bash -c "nuncius codex hi"'])Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/task-accounts/setup.sh:105 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +a "group:$GROUP allow search" "$OWNER_HOME"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstest/mcp.test.js:272 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst cli = spawnSync('node', [path.join(root, 'bin', 'nuncius.js'), 'codex', 'x'], { env: { ...env, NUNCIUS_DEPTH: v }, cwd: repo, encoding: 'utf8' });Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/task-accounts/prove.sh:37 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesexpect_denied "cannot signal your processes" "kill -0 $mine"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstest/claude.test.js:58 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesspawnSync('node', [path.join(root, 'bin', 'nuncius.js'), ...args], { env: { ...env, ...extraEnv }, cwd: repo, input, encoding: 'utf8' });Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiontest/fixtures/fake-claude.js:30 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files…haredArrayBuffer(4)), 0, 0, Number(process.env.FAKE_AFTER_LIMITS_MS)); } console.log(JSON.stringify({ type: 'assistant', message: { content: [{ type: 'tool_use', name: 'Write', input: { file_path: 'c.txt' } }, { type: 'tool_use', name: 'Ba…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstest/mcp.test.js:252 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesassert.equal((await call('get_task', { id: '../../etc/passwd' })).isError, true);Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Privileged sudo commandtest/nuncius.test.js:121 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges'sudo --user=bob codex exec hi', 'env --unset HOME codex exec hi', "env -S'codex exec hi'", 'env --split-string=codex exec',Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
OS command execution function call detectedtest/hardening.test.js:778 · OS command execution function call detected['python3 -c "import os; os.system(\'nuncius config set x 1\')"', 'nuncius settings'],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstest/redteam.test.js:851 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesput('notes.txt'); put('.zshrc'); put('.cache/hf/token'); put('repo/.env'); put('repo/.git/HEAD', 'ref: refs/heads/main\n');Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstest/redteam.test.js:973 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leakingexecFileSync('git', ['-C', repo, 'config', '--worktree', 'remote.origin.url', 'https://user:[email protected]/r.git']);Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagetest/nuncius.test.js:116 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codefor (const cmd of ['codex exec "fix it"', 'cd x && codex "do it"', 'FOO=1 cursor-agent -p "hi"', 'npx @openai/codex exec hi', '/opt/homebrew/bin/codex exec y',Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstest/redteam.test.js:35 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesspawnSync(process.execPath, [path.join(root, 'bin', 'nuncius.js'), ...args], { env: { ...env, ...extraEnv }, cwd, encoding: 'utf8' });Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiontest/redteam.test.js:975 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files…fig.worktree" "$(git rev-parse --git-dir)/config.worktree"; echo end; } > gitout.txt 2>&1\necho \'{"type":"turn.completed","usage":{"input_tokens":1,"output_tokens":1}}\'\n', { mode: 0o755 }); writeConfig({ codexBin: p }); const r =…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtest/progress.test.js:85 · Destructive file system command detectedassert.equal(cleanLabel('rm \u200f-rf \u200bx\ufeff\u2060y'), 'rm -rf x y', 'zero-width and direction marks go too');Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstest/nuncius.test.js:62 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst plainEnv = { ...env, FAKE_CODEX_PRIMARY: '95' };Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Bidirectional text override characters detectedtest/progress.test.js:83 · Bidirectional text override characters detected — may hide content directionassert.equal(cleanLabel('Shell: rm\n-rf \x1b[31mx‮'), 'Shell: rm -rf [31mx');Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstest/redteam.test.js:379 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesassert.equal((await get('/api/task/activity?id=../../etc/passwd')).status, 404);Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiontest/redteam.test.js:913 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files….fsmonitor; cat "$(git rev-parse --git-common-dir)/config"; echo end; } > gitout.txt 2>&1\necho \'{"type":"turn.completed","usage":{"input_tokens":1,"output_tokens":1}}\'\n', { mode: 0o755 }); writeConfig({ codexBin: p }); const r =…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commandtest/redteam.test.js:72 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeswriteConfig({ cursorBin: probe('kill -KILL $PPID; kill -TERM "$FAKE_PID"; true') });Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstest/redteam.test.js:444 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files'.ssh': '~/.ssh',Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
Refusal suppressionREADME.md:56 · Refusal suppression — attempting to prevent safety responses · informational: not an instruction file…ts `--version`: Nuncius relies on some undocumented CLI behaviour, so it warns (never refuses) when a CLI is newer or older than the versions Nuncius was verified with. Aft…Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstest/redteam.test.js:910 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leakingexecFileSync('git', ['-C', repo, 'remote', 'add', 'origin', 'https://user:[email protected]/r.git']);Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstest/redteam.test.js:443 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files'.aws': '~/.aws',Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiontest/redteam.test.js:851 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesput('notes.txt'); put('.zshrc'); put('.cache/hf/token'); put('repo/.env'); put('repo/.git/HEAD', 'ref: refs/heads/main\n');Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commandtest/redteam.test.js:83 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes// perl's setsid leaves the process group, so the group kill misses it; it keeps stdout open.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiontest/redteam.test.js:834 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files…= app-server ] && exit 0\n{ git log --oneline -1; git status --short; } > gitout.txt 2>&1\necho \'{"type":"turn.completed","usage":{"input_tokens":1,"output_tokens":1}}\'\n', { mode: 0o755 }); writeConfig({ codexBin: p }); const r =…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagetest/nuncius.test.js:125 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code… status', 'grep codex README.md', 'echo cursor-agent', 'sudo codex --version', 'npx @openai/codex login', 'claude', 'claude mcp list', 'claude --version', 'nuncius claude "hi"']…Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,373 tok
1 file · 80 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

12 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. OS command execution function call detected≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim sdirkse: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  6. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
Publish a new version to Glama, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim sdirksePropose a patch to the maintainer